Terrestial-signal based exclusion zone compliance

ABSTRACT

An exclusion zone compliance circuit comprises a terrestrial radio signal reception component for receiving a terrestrial radio signal comprising a unique identification of a transmission source. A non-volatile memory component of the circuit stores an encrypted data set describing boundaries of an exclusion zone. A navigation data deriving component of the circuit accesses a data set and compares the unique identification with a station identification of the transmission source and the geographic position of the transmission source. The navigation data deriving component derives a geographic position of the exclusion zone compliance circuit and determines whether the exclusion zone compliance circuit is located within an exclusion zone. A data blocking component of the circuit accesses the encrypted data set. A data control component of the exclusion zone compliance circuit blocks output of a signal in response to an indication that the circuit is located within an exclusion zone.

RELATED U.S. APPLICATION

The present application is a Continuation-in-Part Application of U.S.utility patent application Ser. No. 12/100,163, filed Apr. 9, 2008 nowU.S. Pat. No. 7,898,409 by Peter Van Wyck Loomis, James M. Janky, andBruce D. Ritter entitled A Circuit for Exclusion Zone Compliance, whichis assigned to the assignee of the present technology and which isincorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

Geographic data is increasingly used to provide geo-spatial data to awide variety of business, government, and academic applications.Increasingly, remote Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiversare used to collect position data in a wide variety of electronicdevices. For example, the GNSS receivers are now incorporated intocellular telephones, personal digital assistants (PDAs), dedicatednavigation devices, surveying instruments, construction equipment, etc.Additionally, GNSS receivers are often used to monitor the geographicposition of high value items such as vehicles, laptop computer systems,or even packages which are being shipped. Thus, there are a wide varietyof commercially available devices which utilize satellite navigationtechnology.

However, satellite navigation systems may be considered “dual-use”technology which means that the satellite navigation system may be usedin a commercial, or military, application. As an example, a group ornation may convert a commercial satellite navigation device to amilitary purpose as a low-cost alternative to acquiring a militarysatellite navigation device with a dedicated military function. Thisalso subverts monitoring of weapons proliferation, especially theproliferation of precision guided weapons.

Alternatively, resale of commercial products having satellite navigationcomponents is also a problem for countries with laws prohibiting suchresale. In addition, a satellite navigation product which is intendedfor one market at a first cost may be resold for a profit in anothermarket at a higher cost. This can undercut the profits of the companywhich originally sold the product and subvert the law of the country ofmanufacture, or where the operative enterprise may be domiciled.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and form a part ofthis specification, illustrate embodiments of the present technologyand, together with the description, serve to explain the principles ofthe technology. Unless specifically noted, the drawings referred to inthis description should be understood as not being drawn to scale.

FIG. 1A is a block diagram of a circuit for exclusion zone compliance inaccordance with embodiments of the present technology.

FIG. 1B is a block diagram of an example GNSS receiver which may be usedin accordance with an embodiment of the present technology.

FIG. 1C is a block diagram of a circuit for exclusion zone compliance inaccordance with embodiments of the present technology.

FIG. 1D is a block diagram of a circuit for exclusion zone compliance inaccordance with embodiments of the present technology.

FIG. 1E is a block diagram of a circuit for exclusion zone compliance inaccordance with embodiments of the present technology.

FIG. 1F is a block diagram of a circuit for exclusion zone compliance inaccordance with embodiments of the present technology.

FIG. 1G is a block diagram of a circuit for exclusion zone compliance inaccordance with embodiments of the present technology.

FIG. 1H is a block diagram of a circuit for exclusion zone compliance inaccordance with embodiments of the present technology.

FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a method for implementing an exclusion zone ofa GNSS receiver in accordance with an embodiment of the presenttechnology.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram of an example circuit for disabling a circuitfor exclusion zone compliance in accordance with an embodiment of thepresent technology.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram of an example non-volatile memory inaccordance with one embodiment of the present technology.

FIG. 5 is a block diagram of a date comparison component in accordancewith an embodiment of the present technology.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram of an electronic device which implementsterrestrial-signal based exclusion zone compliance in accordance with anembodiment of the present technology.

FIG. 7 is a block diagram of a circuit for implementingterrestrial-based exclusion zone compliance in accordance with anembodiment of the present technology.

FIG. 8 is a flowchart of a method for applying exclusion zone compliancein accordance with an embodiment of the present technology.

FIG. 9 is a flowchart of a method for applying exclusion zone compliancein accordance with an embodiment of the present technology.

FIG. 10 shows the principles of estimating the position of a receiverbased upon time of flight or time of arrival measurements in accordancewith various embodiments.

FIG. 11 is a high level functional block diagram of an electronic devicewhich includes features of a circuit for implementing exclusion zonecompliance, in accordance with various embodiments of the presenttechnology.

DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS

Reference will now be made in detail to various embodiments, examples ofwhich are illustrated in the accompanying drawings. While the subjectmatter will be described in conjunction with these embodiments, it willbe understood that they are not intended to limit the subject matter tothese embodiments. Furthermore, in the following description, numerousspecific details are set forth in order to provide a thoroughunderstanding of the subject matter. In other instances, well-knownmethods, procedures, objects, and circuits have not been described indetail as not to unnecessarily obscure aspects of the subject matter.

Some portions of the detailed descriptions which follow are presented interms of procedures, logic blocks, processing and other symbolicrepresentations of operations on data bits within a computer memory.These descriptions and representations are the means used by thoseskilled in the data processing arts to most effectively convey thesubstance of their work to others skilled in the art. In the presentapplication, a procedure, logic block, process, or the like, isconceived to be a self-consistent sequence of steps or instructionsleading to a desired result. The steps are those requiring physicalmanipulations of physical quantities. Usually, although not necessarily,these quantities take the form of electrical or magnetic signals capableof being stored, transferred, combined, compared, and otherwisemanipulated in a computer system.

It should be borne in mind, however, that all of these and similar termsare to be associated with the appropriate physical quantities and aremerely convenient labels applied to these quantities. Unlessspecifically stated otherwise as apparent from the followingdiscussions, it is appreciated that throughout the present application,discussions utilizing terms such as “receiving,” “accessing,” “using,”“generating,” “deriving,” “utilizing,” “disabling,” “storing,”“determining,” or the like, refer to the action and processes of acomputer system, or similar electronic computing device, thatmanipulates and transforms data represented as physical (electronic)quantities within the computer system's registers and memories intoother data similarly represented as physical quantities within thecomputer system memories or registers or other such information storage,transmission or display devices.

FIG. 1A is a block diagram of a circuit 100 for exclusion zonecompliance in accordance with embodiments of the present technology. Inembodiments of the present technology, circuit 100 may be a component ofa dedicated position determining device such as a surveying receivercapable of high precision and high accuracy positioning, a personalnavigation system, an in-vehicle navigation system for use in personaldriving, or for use in guiding a farm vehicle or a military vehicle, atracking device, a specialized guidance device whereby a guidance vectoris created between the current location and a desired location, or thelike. In other embodiments, circuit 100 is not a component of adedicated position determining device, but is a component which providesposition determining functionality for an electronic device. Forexample, cellular telephones, PDAs, and automobiles are increasinglyequipped with some form of GNSS capability in order to provide a userwith geographic positioning and position-based information.

In one embodiment, circuit 100 comprises a satellite navigation signalreception component 102 which is communicatively coupled with an antenna101. It is noted that while antenna 101 is shown disposed outside ofcircuit 100, it can also comprise a component of circuit 100 in anembodiment of the present technology. In one embodiment, satellitenavigation signal reception component 102 comprises a Global NavigationSatellite System (GNSS) baseband processor and Radio Frequency (RF)front-end. GNSS RF front-end components are used for receiving at leastone signal from at least one GNSS satellite and for converting thatsignal into an intermediate frequency signal. GNSS baseband processorsare used to sample the intermediate frequency signals and for acquiringand tracking the signal received from the GNSS satellites in view. TheGNSS baseband processor also is used to derive timing measurements fromthe clock offset component of the position fix solution, obtained byprocessing the intermediate frequency signal from the GNSS RF front-end.The GNSS baseband processor also can determine pseudoranges, signalphases, and Doppler frequency shift data from processing theintermediate frequency signal. These basic functions are well known inthe Global Positioning System (GPS) and GNSS arts.

Circuit 100 further comprises a navigation data deriving component 103which is communicatively coupled with satellite navigation signalreception component 102 and with a position data serial port 105 via adata control component 104. In embodiments of the present technology,navigation data deriving component 103 is for determining the geographicposition of the antenna 101 and the associated circuit 100 based uponthe data from satellite navigation signal reception component 102. Inone embodiment, circuit 100 comprises a non-volatile memory 130 forpersistent storage of digital information and instructions for circuit100. In one embodiment, non-volatile memory 130 is used for storing theoperating system for circuit 100. In one embodiment, this may include,but is not limited to, instructions and data for satellite navigationreception component 102, navigation data deriving component 103, datacontrol component 104, data blocking component 120, microprocessorsystem 154 of FIG. 1B, and navigation processor 158 of FIG. 1B.

In embodiments of the present technology, data control component 104 isfor blocking the output of a signal from navigation data derivingcomponent 103 in response to determining that circuit 100 is locatedwithin an exclusion zone. In one embodiment, navigation data derivingcomponent 103 compares the current geographic position of circuit 100against a data set (131) of coordinates of at least one exclusion zone.In another embodiment, data control component 104 receives the currentgeographic position of circuit 100 from navigation data derivingcomponent 103 and accesses the encrypted data set 131 for thecoordinates defining the exclusion zone(s). Data control component 104then determines whether circuit 100 is currently located within anexclusion zone. For the purposes of the present technology, an exclusionzone is a geographic region in which GNSS positioning data is not to bemade accessible, outside the confines of the packaged circuit of circuit100. In embodiments of the present technology, if it is determined thatcircuit 100 is currently located within an exclusion zone, navigationdata deriving component 103 generates a signal to data control component104 which indicates that circuit 100 is currently located within anexclusion zone.

In response to an indication that circuit 100 is currently locatedwithin an exclusion zone, data control component 104 blocks the outputof a signal from navigation data deriving component 103. In embodimentsof the present technology, data control component 104 can block theoutput of satellite navigation signals received from antenna 101,unprocessed position data such as timing data, pseudoranges, signalphases, Doppler signal shifts, a control signal, or a geographicposition derived by navigation data deriving component 103. In so doing,circuit 100 is no longer usable for supplying geographic position datawhile it is located within an exclusion zone.

In one embodiment, data control component 104 will permanently block theoutput of a signal from navigation data deriving component 103 inresponse to an indication that circuit 100 is located within anexclusion zone. For example in one embodiment, data control component104 is configured such that it cannot be reset once it blocks the outputof a signal from navigation data deriving component 103. In other words,once data control component 104 blocks the output of a signal fromnavigation data deriving component 103, it cannot be reset to laterfacilitate conveying a signal from navigation data deriving component103. Thus, once it has been determined that circuit 100 is within anexclusion zone, it is permanently disabled and cannot be used to receivenavigation signals, or to output data used for determining a geographicposition. In another embodiment, data control component 104 isconfigured to output a signal to another device (e.g., circuit 300 ofFIG. 3) which will disable circuit 100, or otherwise prevent it fromoutputting a signal. In another embodiment, data control component 104is configured to output a signal to non-volatile memory 130 such that itcan no longer output the data and instructions necessary for circuit 100to function.

In another embodiment, data control component 104 only blocks the outputof a signal from navigation data deriving component 103 while circuit100 is currently located in an exclusion zone. In other words, ifcircuit 100 is moved from an exclusion zone to an area outside of theexclusion zone, data control component 104 will permit navigation dataderiving component 103 to output a signal via position data serial port105. It is noted that data control component 104 may be implementedwithin navigation data deriving component 103 in one embodiment of thepresent technology.

In one embodiment, encrypted data set 131 is stored in a non-volatilememory 130. In one embodiment, non-volatile memory 130 comprises aread-only memory (ROM) device. In other words, encrypted data set 131 ispermanently stored in non-volatile memory 130 and cannot be updated. Inanother embodiment, non-volatile memory 130 comprises a programmablememory device such as a Flash memory or the like. Thus, in oneembodiment, encrypted data set 131 can be updated to include additionalexclusion zones as they are identified, or to remove exclusion zones asdesired.

In the embodiment of FIG. 1A, navigation data deriving component 103 anddata control component 104 are communicatively coupled with non-volatilememory 130 via a data blocking component 120. Data blocking component120 controls the accessing of encrypted data set 131 from non-volatilememory 130. As shown in FIG. 1C, data blocking component 120 comprises achecksum determining component 121, and a checksum comparing component122.

In one embodiment, checksum determining component 121 is for determiningthe checksum value 121 a of encrypted data set 131. This checksum value121 a is then passed to checksum comparing component 122 which comparesthe checksum value 121 a with a checksum value 132 stored innon-volatile memory 130. In one embodiment, checksum value 132 is achecksum value of encrypted data set 131 when it is first stored innon-volatile memory 130. If encrypted data set 131 is then altered afterit has been stored in non-volatile memory 130, checksum value 121 a, asdetermined by checksum determining component 121, will no longer matchthe checksum value 132. Thus, checksum comparing component 122 candetermine if encrypted data set 131 has been altered after it has beenstored in non-volatile memory 130.

In one embodiment of the present technology, if checksum comparingcomponent 122 determines that checksum value 121 a does not match thechecksum value 132, data blocking component 120 will prevent accessingof encrypted data set 131 by navigation data deriving component 103and/or data control component 104. In one embodiment, if data controlcomponent 104 cannot access encrypted data set 131, it automaticallyblocks the output of a signal from navigation data deriving component103. In so doing, embodiments of the present technology can authenticatethe integrity of encrypted data set 131 and prevent alteration of theexclusion zones. Thus, if an entity tries to circumvent the exclusionzone features of circuit 100 by changing the coordinates of one or moreexclusion zones, data blocking component 120 renders circuit 100unusable because necessary data for determining the geographic positionof circuit 100 is not accessible.

In the embodiment of FIG. 1D, data blocking component 120 comprises adate comparison component 123 for comparing a date associated withencrypted data set 131 with a second date corresponding to a valid dataset. In one embodiment of the present technology, a date 131 a isassociated with encrypted data set 131 which facilitates determiningwhether a valid, or current, data set is used to define exclusion zones.It is noted that date 131 a can comprise the current day, week, month,and year as well as a time of day (e.g., 1 PM Eastern Standard Time) inone embodiment. In one embodiment, encrypted data set 131 is required tobe periodically updated in order to reflect any changes to thecoordinates of the exclusion zones. As described above, this may includeadding more exclusion zones, or removing some exclusion zones. In oneembodiment, an updated data set may be received via a wireless network.In another embodiment, an updated data set may require that a removabledata storage medium (e.g., a Smart Card, Universal Serial Bus (USB)drive, SmartMedia card, MultiMedia card, MicroDrive™ device,CompactFlash™ device, MemoryStick device, SecureDigital card, opticaldata storage device, or the like) is communicatively coupled withnavigation data deriving component 103 via encrypted data set input 128.

In one embodiment, date comparison component 123 can be used to preventthe output of time sensitive data via circuit 100. For example, anexclusion zone list may only be valid until a certain date. In oneembodiment, the exclusion zone list is encrypted and stored innon-volatile memory 130 as an encrypted data set (e.g., encrypted dataset 131). In one embodiment, date comparison component 123 compares thecurrent time and date with a date attribute of the encrypted data set131 which describes when the encrypted data set 131 expires, or is nolonger to be made available. In one embodiment, when date comparisoncomponent 123 determines that the encrypted data set 131 has expired, itwill generate a signal to data control component 104. In response, datacontrol component 104 blocks the output of the encrypted data set 131.In one embodiment, date comparison component 123 flags the encrypteddata set 131 which marks it as an expired data set.

In one embodiment of the present technology, date comparison component123 determines whether date 131 a corresponds with a valid data set. Forexample, if there is a requirement to update encrypted data set 131monthly, date comparison component 123 determines whether encrypted dataset 131 has been updated within the last month. In one embodiment, ifdate comparison component 123 determines that encrypted data set 131 isnot a valid data set, data blocking component 120 will prevent accessingof encrypted data set 131 by navigation data deriving component 103and/or data control component 104. Again, this will prevent theoperation of circuit 100. Thus, if an entity tries to circumvent anexclusion zone restriction by using an older data set, circuit 100 willbe rendered unusable. Additionally, data blocking component 120 may alsoprevent accessing of software instructions 133 by navigation dataderiving component 103 and/or data control component 104 as well. Inembodiments of the present technology, software instructions 133 maycomprise an almanac which helps navigation data deriving component 103determine where GNSS satellites are in their respective orbits. Softwareinstructions 133 may also comprise an encryption/decryption algorithmused to encrypt and/or decrypt encrypted data set 131.

In FIG. 1E, circuit 100 further comprises an encryption key comparator124 for comparing a stored encryption key 125 with an encryption key 131b associated with encrypted data set 131. In one embodiment, encrypteddata set 131 is encrypted using standard encryption techniques, e.g.,Message Digest algorithm 5 (MD-5), Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA), etc. Inone embodiment, a private key (e.g., encryption key 125) is loaded intocircuit 100 during production. Thus, encryption key 125 is inaccessibleto a user of circuit 100. In one embodiment, encryption key 125 maycomprise a portion of a larger encrypted sequence stored in circuit 100.For example, a 64-bit sequence may be stored. However, encryption key125 may only comprise a 32-bit sequence within that 64-bit sequence.This makes it harder for an end user to determine what portion of thestored sequence is the actual encryption key 125. It is noted thatencryption key 125 may be stored in navigation data deriving component103, non-volatile memory 130, or volatile memory 190 in embodiments ofthe present technology. It is further noted the volatile memory 190 canalso be used to store data and instructions for navigation data derivingcomponent 103 and data control component 104.

In one embodiment of the present technology, encryption key comparator124 compares stored encryption key 125 with encryption key 131 b priorto loading encrypted data set 131 into non-volatile memory 130. In oneembodiment, encryption key 131 b is used to encrypt encrypted data set131 prior to it being loaded into non-volatile memory 130 via encrypteddata set input 128. In one embodiment, stored encryption key 125 andencryption key 131 b are both encrypted themselves. In one embodiment,if stored encryption key 125 does not match encryption key 131 b whichis within encrypted data set 131, data blocking component 120 preventsthe loading of encrypted data set 131 into non-volatile memory 130. Ifstored encryption key 125 does match encryption key 131 b which iswithin encrypted data set 131, encryption key 125 is used to decryptencrypted data set 131 prior to its being accessed by navigation dataderiving component 103 and/or data control component 104. Thisfacilitates authenticating encrypted data set 131 prior to loading itinto non-volatile memory 130.

In FIG. 1F, circuit comprises an encrypted data set input 185 and anencrypted data set output 186 which are communicatively coupled via datacontrol component 104. In one embodiment, circuit 100 can be used tocontrol the output of data from a device to which circuit iscommunicatively coupled. For example, circuit 100 can be communicativelycoupled with a cellular telephone, a handheld computer system such as aPersonal Digital Assistant (PDA), a laptop computer system, a generalpurpose computer system, or other electronic device. In one embodiment,data from a device to which circuit 100 is coupled passes throughcircuit 100 prior to its output. Thus, data cannot be displayed,downloaded, shared, copied, or accessed unless it passes via circuit 100first. In one embodiment, circuit 100 can be used to control the outputof data from an electronic device to which it is coupled. For example,in one embodiment circuit 100 can be used to prevent the output of databased upon the geographic position determined by navigation dataderiving component 103. In other words, if it is determined that circuit100 is within an exclusion zone, the output of data from circuit 100will be blocked by data control component 104.

In one embodiment, the data blocked by data control component 104comprises, but is not limited to, navigation data from navigation dataderiving component 103, data stored in volatile memory 190, data storedin non-volatile memory 130, or data which is input to circuit 100 viaencrypted data set input 165. In one embodiment, the encryption key usedto decrypt data input from encrypted data input 185 is stored in circuit100. As described above, circuit can be used to decrypt an encrypteddata set determining whether a stored data set has been alteredsubsequent to its being stored in circuit 100. It is noted that there isno requirement for data input via encrypted data set input 165 to beencrypted in one embodiment. As will be explained in greater detailbelow, the data described above may be blocked from being output bycircuit 100 based upon the date, or current time, or based upon thespeed at which circuit 100 is moving, or a combination thereof in oneembodiment. The use of date, time, and/or speed to determine whetherdata is output by circuit 100 can be used in conjunction with ageographic position of circuit 100 in one embodiment.

In FIG. 1G, circuit 100 comprises a speed determining component 170. Inone embodiment, speed determining component 170 is configured todetermine the speed of circuit 100. In one embodiment, speed determiningcomponent 170 receives position data from navigation data derivingcomponent 103 and determines if circuit is exceeding a pre-determinedspeed threshold. For example, in one embodiment speed determiningcomponent 170 can receive successive measurements of the geographicposition of circuit 100 from navigation data deriving component 103.Based upon the time interval of the successive measurements ofgeographic position, speed determining component 170 can then determinethe speed of circuit 100. It is noted that other methods may be used byspeed determining component 170 as well. For example, speed determiningcomponent 170 may also be configured to determine the speed of circuit100 based upon an analysis of the Doppler shift of received satellitenavigation signals due to motion of circuit 100. The speed of circuit100 is compared with a pre-determined speed threshold to determine ifcircuit 100 is moving, or is moving faster than the speed threshold. Itis noted that the speed threshold 390 can be set to comply with exportcontrol regulations. For example, one standard for export control ofsensitive technology does not permit the export of a satellitenavigation device which is capable of providing navigation informationat speeds in excess of 600 meters/second. Thus, in one embodiment thespeed threshold 390 is set at a minimum of 600 meters/second. It isnoted that the speed threshold 390 can be set at a limit lower than 600meters/second. For example, if speed threshold 390 is set at a speed of8 miles per hour, it may be assumed that circuit 100 is disposed in amoving vehicle when its speed exceeds 8 miles per hour. Alternatively,it may be assumed that the user of circuit 100 is engaged in an activitywhich requires a greater attention to safety. In one embodiment, speeddetermining component 170 uses signal generator 176 to generate a signalto data control component 104 when the speed of circuit 100 exceeds thespeed threshold. In response to the signal from speed determiningcomponent 170 data control component 104 blocks the output of a signalfrom circuit 100.

In another embodiment, speed comparator 175 may perform a comparison ofthe expected GNSS Doppler frequency shift measurements from a remotesource and GNSS Doppler frequency shift measurements performed bycircuit 100 to determine the speed of circuit 100. In one embodiment,Assisted-GPS (A-GPS) technology is used to facilitate the process ofdetermining the position of circuit 100. A-GPS is a system in whichoutside sources provide a GPS receiver with data permitting the receiverto find GPS satellite signals more readily than can be done on a standalone basis. The data is derived from a GNSS receiver which is remotelylocated from the circuit 100 and provides the A-GPS data to the circuit.Because of the proximity of the GNSS receiver to circuit 100, GNSSsignal data such as code phases, Doppler frequency shifts, etc., as wellas local signal errors due to atmospheric or physical conditions shouldbe approximately the same for both the remotely located GNSS receiverand circuit 100. By sending this information to circuit 100, the time tofix and track GNSS satellites is greatly reduced for circuit 100. TheA-GPS system is widely used to comply with the wireless E911 standardwhich mandated that cellular telephone position information be madeavailable to emergency call dispatchers because it permits a cellulartelephone to generate a position fix quicker than if an autonomousposition fix was being generated.

Because GPS, and other GNSS navigation systems, rely upon a plurality ofsatellites which broadcast a unique code, GNSS receivers must determinewhich codes are being received at a particular location. The receivermust correlate the received C/A code with a stored version and thendetermine a time delay between when the C/A code was broadcast and whenit was received by the receiver. Because the satellite is constantlymoving with reference to the receiver, a Doppler shift of the frequencyof the C/A code is encountered which can hinder acquisition of thesatellite signals because the receiver has to search for the frequencyof the C/A code. As a result, it can take minutes for a GPS receiver tocreate an initial position fix autonomously.

A-GPS was developed to overcome the difficulties in acquiring a signaland to speed the time it takes a receiver to generate a position fix.Due to the proximity of the GPS receiver at the cellular base station tothe location of a cellular telephone, the GNSS Dopplers, GNSS codephases, and satellite bit times at the cellular base station (e.g., 510of FIG. 5) should closely approximate those of the location of thecellular telephone (e.g., circuit 100). Thus, by providing thisinformation to the GPS receiver in the cellular telephone, the GPSreceiver can acquire and track satellites better and realize an increasein signal sensitivity.

In one embodiment, navigation data deriving component 103 of circuit 100uses the GNSS signal acquisition assistance data to more quickly acquirethe satellites within view. In one embodiment, this includes, but is notlimited to, synchronizing local oscillators to the desired carrierfrequencies, tuning with the predicted Dopplers to account for frequencyshift due to the relative motion of the satellite and circuit 100, andnarrowing the code phase searches based upon the predicted GNSS codephases sent from the A-GPS system. Circuit 100 may further use a GPStime estimate for GPS data bit timing, pre-detection interval timing,generating a clock time tag for a GNSS signal, and for linearizingpseudoranges to satellites. It is noted that in one embodiment,Assisted-GPS data is not required for circuit 100 to determine itsposition. However, in one embodiment the use of Assisted-GPS data isbeneficial in reducing the time to first fix for circuit 100.

In one embodiment, the speed of circuit 100 is performed using vectoranalysis. For example, in one embodiment the Doppler frequency shift ofsignals from each satellite in view of the A-GPS system is convertedwith vector arithmetic into a 3-dimensional vector. Each satelliteDoppler frequency shift is equivalent by constants to a rate of changein the distance between the satellite and a GNSS receiver (e.g., of theA-GPS system, or navigation data deriving component 103 of circuit 100).The Doppler frequency shift is due to the movement of the satelliterelative to the GNSS receiver of the A-GPS system or of circuit 100.Typically, three 3-dimensional Dopplers, or range rates, are convertedwith vector arithmetic into a 3-dimensional vector. In one embodiment,the expected 3-dimensional vector, which is calculated based upon therelative motion between a satellite and the A-GPS system, is comparedwith the measured Doppler frequency shift which is based upon therelative motion between the satellite and circuit 100. The difference ofthese two values can be attributed to the motion of circuit 100 alone asthe A-GPS system is stationary. In one embodiment, speed determiningcomponent 170 uses the data sent by the A-GPS system to determine the3-dimensional vector which describes the motion of the satelliterelative to the A-GPS system. Speed determining component 170 can alsouse data based upon the analysis of a GNSS signal received by antenna101 to determine the motion of circuit 100 relative to the satellite.Comparator 175 is configured to compare these two values to determinethe speed of circuit 100 in one embodiment. It is noted that thefunctionality of speed determining component 170 is in navigation dataderiving component 103 in one embodiment.

In FIG. 1H, data blocking component 120 comprises checksum determiningcomponent 121, checksum value 121 a, checksum comparing component 122,date comparison component 123, encryption key comparator 124, andencryption key 125. Circuit 100 further comprises encrypted data setinput 185 and an encrypted data set output 186. Circuit 100 furthercomprises speed determining component 170. In FIG. 1H, circuit 100further comprises an altitude limiting component 195. In one embodiment,altitude limiting component 195 is configured to receive an indicationof the altitude of circuit 100 from navigation data deriving component103 and for comparing that altitude with a stored altitude thresholdvalue. It is well known in the art that a GNSS receiver (e.g.,navigation data deriving component 103) can also derive the altitude ofa device based upon a plurality of received satellite navigationsignals. In the embodiment of FIG. 1H, altitude limiting component 195generates a signal when the altitude of circuit 100 exceeds a pre-setaltitude threshold. As an example, export control regulations haverestricted the export of navigation devices to devices with an altitudelimit of no more than 18,000 meters. Thus, altitude limiting component195 can be configured to generate a signal when it determines that thealtitude of circuit 100 exceeds 18,000 meters. It is noted that thealtitude threshold can be set to a lower altitude if so desired. In oneembodiment, the altitude threshold cannot be modified after manufacture.In response to the signal generated by altitude limiting component 195,data control component 104 blocks the output of a signal from circuit100.

It is noted that data blocking component 120 may comprise othercombinations of components described above with reference to FIGS. 1C,1D, and 1E. For example, in one embodiment data blocking component 120comprises checksum determining component 121, checksum value 121 a,checksum comparing component 122, and date comparison component 123. Inone embodiment, data blocking component 120 comprises checksumdetermining component 121, checksum value 121 a, checksum comparingcomponent 122, encryption key comparator 124, and encryption key 125. Inone embodiment, data blocking component 120 comprises date comparisoncomponent 123, encryption key comparator 124, and encryption key 125.

In FIGS. 1A, 1C, 1D, 1E, 1F, 1G, and 1H circuit 100 further comprises apower coupling 129 for supplying power to circuit 100. In oneembodiment, circuit 100 operates continuously, even when a device whichutilizes circuit 100 is shut down. Thus, in one embodiment circuit 100continuously monitors its geographic position without regard to thepower status of a device to which it is coupled. In one embodiment, ifpower to circuit 100 is interrupted, data control component 104 requiresa login procedure is followed to permit the output of a signal from saidnavigation data deriving component 103. In one embodiment, if power tocircuit 100 is interrupted, encryption key 125 is no longer usable tocircuit 100. For example, encryption key 125 will be lost if it isstored in volatile memory 190 and power to circuit 100 is interrupted.Thus, to be able to render circuit 100 usable, a correct encryptedencryption key 125 has to be loaded into circuit 100. In one embodiment,a correct encryption key 125 will not be made accessible for loadinginto circuit 100 unless the identity of the party currently inpossession of circuit 100 can be verified.

Thus, embodiments of the present technology can facilitate the export ofa geographic position determining device and/or data accessible viacircuit 100 while reducing the likelihood that it can be misused by, forexample, commercial entities, rogue nations, or other groups. Forexample, if a certain government is deemed likely to misuse GNSS data,that nation may be designated as a restricted area. As a result, use ofcircuit 100 to determine a geographic position will be prevented.Circuit 100 may operate anywhere in the world and the exclusionary zonemay be located anywhere in the world. In another embodiment, sensitivedata will not be accessible unless circuit 100 is located outside of anexclusion zone. In another embodiment, time sensitive data will not beaccessible via circuit when the time period for accessing that data hasexpired. In another embodiment, circuit 100 can be used to prevent theaccessing of data, including geographic data, or data used to determinea geographic position, if circuit 100 is moving, or is moving fasterthan a pre-determined speed threshold. This facilitates implementingweapons proliferation controls as circuit 100 cannot be altered for useas, for example, a weapons guidance system, or used in a manner whichcircumvents a commercial agreement. Thus, even if an unintended thirdparty should gain control of a properly exported version of circuit 100,that third party cannot use or alter circuit 100 for use within adesignated exclusion zone.

It is further noted that circuit 100 may be implemented to enforcecommercial exclusion zones in addition to other considerations which maydetermine exclusion zones. Thus, if an entity, such as a communicationsnetwork for example, utilizes GNSS derived data, access to this data canbe prevented if that entity fails to pay a royalty or other fee. Anotherexample in which commercial exclusion zones may be implemented inaccordance with the present technology is to prevent purchasing circuit100 in a low cost region and re-selling it in a higher cost region inorder to turn a profit. In embodiments of the present technology,circuit 100 limits the output of a signal from navigation data derivingcomponent 103 to regions in which it is allowed to operate (e.g., a lowcost region) to prevent unauthorized re-selling at a profit.

Additionally, in embodiments of the present technology, the designatedexclusion zones may be dynamically updated to reflect changed relations.Thus, it is also possible to quickly redefine one or more of theexclusion zones to permit operation of circuit 100 within that zone. Forexample, if a government determines that a nation is to no longer beexcluded from using circuit 100, the definition of which geographicregions are considered exclusion zones can be updated to reflect the newstatus of that nation. Alternatively, if the price of circuit 100, or anelectronic device coupled therewith, in a previously excluded region isnow comparable to the price in a second region, the definitions of theexclusion zones can be updated such that circuit 100 can be operated inthe previously excluded region.

Example GNSS Receiver

With reference now to FIG. 1B, a block diagram is shown of an embodimentof an example GNSS receiver which may be used in accordance with variousembodiments described herein. In particular, FIG. 1B illustrates a blockdiagram of a GNSS receiver in the form of a general purpose GPS receiver180 capable of demodulation of the L1 and/or L2 signal(s) received fromone or more GPS satellites. It is noted that the components describedbelow with reference to FIG. 1B may be performed by satellite navigationsignal reception component 102 and navigation data deriving component103 described above with reference to FIG. 1A. For the purposes of thefollowing discussion, the demodulation of L1 and/or L2 signals isdiscussed. It is noted that demodulation of the L2 signal(s) istypically performed by “high precision” GNSS receivers such as thoseused in the military and some civilian applications. Typically, the“consumer” grade GNSS receivers do not access the L2 signal(s).Embodiments of the present technology may be utilized by GNSS receiverswhich access the L1 signals alone, or in combination with the L2signal(s). A more detailed discussion of the function of a receiver suchas GPS receiver 180 can be found in U.S. Pat. No. 5,621,426. U.S. Pat.No. 5,621,426, by Gary R. Lennen, is titled “Optimized processing ofsignals for enhanced cross-correlation in a satellite positioning systemreceiver,” and includes a GPS receiver very similar to GPS receiver 180of FIG. 1B.

In FIG. 1B, received L1 and L2 signal is generated by at least one GPSsatellite. Each GPS satellite generates different signal L1 and L2signals and they are processed by different digital channel processors152 which operate in the same way as one another. FIG. 1B shows GPSsignals (L1=1575.42 MHz, L2=1227.60 MHz) entering GPS receiver 180through a dual frequency antenna 101. Antenna 101 may be a magneticallymountable model commercially available from Trimble® Navigation ofSunnyvale, Calif., 94085. Master oscillator 148 provides the referenceoscillator which drives all other clocks in the system. Frequencysynthesizer 138 takes the output of master oscillator 148 and generatesimportant clock and local oscillator frequencies used throughout thesystem. For example, in one embodiment frequency synthesizer 138generates several timing signals such as a 1st LO1 (local oscillator)signal 1400 MHz, a 2nd LO2 signal 175 MHz, a (sampling clock) SCLKsignal 25 MHz, and a MSEC (millisecond) signal used by the system as ameasurement of local reference time.

A filter/LNA (Low Noise Amplifier) 134 performs filtering and low noiseamplification of both L1 and L2 signals. The noise figure of GPSreceiver 180 is dictated by the performance of the filter/LNAcombination. The downconverter 136 mixes both L1 and L2 signals infrequency down to approximately 175 MHz and outputs the analogue L1 andL2 signals into an IF (intermediate frequency) processor 30. IFprocessor 150 takes the analog L1 and L2 signals at approximately 175MHz and converts them into digitally sampled L1 and L2 inphase (L1 I andL2 I) and quadrature signals (L1 Q and L2 Q) at carrier frequencies 420KHz for L1 and at 2.6 MHz for L2 signals respectively.

At least one digital channel processor 152 inputs the digitally sampledL1 and L2 inphase and quadrature signals. All digital channel processors152 are typically are identical by design and typically operate onidentical input samples. Each digital channel processor 152 is designedto digitally track the L1 and L2 signals produced by one satellite bytracking code and carrier signals and to form code and carrier phasemeasurements in conjunction with the microprocessor system 154. Onedigital channel processor 152 is capable of tracking one satellite inboth L1 and L2 channels. Microprocessor system 154 is a general purposecomputing device which facilitates tracking and measurements processes,providing pseudorange and carrier phase measurements for a navigationprocessor 158. In one embodiment, microprocessor system 154 providessignals to control the operation of one or more digital channelprocessors 152. Navigation processor 158 performs the higher levelfunction of combining measurements in such a way as to produce position,velocity and time information for the differential and surveyingfunctions. Storage 160 is coupled with navigation processor 158 andmicroprocessor system 154. It is appreciated that storage 160 maycomprise a volatile or non-volatile storage such as a RAM or ROM, orsome other computer readable memory device or media. It is noted that inone embodiment, the output from any of digital channel processors 152,microprocessor system 154, and navigation processor 158 may becommunicatively coupled with data control component 104 of FIG. 1A. Inone embodiment, GPS receiver 180 is configured to output a signal whenthe L1 and/or L2 signals from at least one GPS satellite cannot beaccessed, or detected, by GPS receiver 180. In response to this signal,data control component 104 will automatically block the output of asignal from circuit 100. This is to prevent bypassing the data blockingfunctions of circuit 100 by preventing navigation data derivingcomponent from determining the geographic position of circuit 100.

One example of a GPS chipset upon which embodiments of the presenttechnology may be implemented is the Copernicus™ chipset which iscommercially available from Trimble® Navigation of Sunnyvale, Calif.,94085. Other examples of a GPS chipsets upon which embodiments of thepresent technology may be implemented are the SiRFstar III™ GSC3e/LP andGSC3f/LP chipsets which are commercially available from SiRF® TechnologyInc., of San Jose, Calif., 95112. In other words, the Copernicus™ andSiRFstar III™ chipsets may integrate components of circuit 100 in orderto control the regions in which the GPS receiver is operational.

It is noted that in one embodiment the components of circuit 100 shownin FIGS. 1A, 1C, 1D, 1E, 1F, 1G, and 1H are a plurality of discreetcomponents disposed upon a printed circuit board. In other words,circuit 100 is implemented as a plurality integrated circuits of thechipset of a satellite navigation device. In another embodiment, thecomponents of circuit 100 are implemented as a single integrated circuitchip. Furthermore, in one embodiment the components of circuit 100discussed above may be filled surrounded by an epoxy duringmanufacturing to make physical tampering with these components (e.g.,altering wires, connections, ports, etc.) more difficult. It is notedthat the filling or surrounding with epoxy may not extend to the RFcomponents of circuit 100 and/or GPS receiver 180 of FIG. 2.

FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a method 200 for implementing exclusion zonecompliance in accordance with one embodiment of the present technology.In operation 210 of FIG. 2, a satellite navigation signal receptioncomponent disposed within a circuit is utilized for receiving at leastone signal from at least one Global Navigation Satellite Systemsatellite. As discussed above, satellite navigation signal receptioncomponent 102 of circuit 100 is used for receiving at least one signalfrom at least one GNSS satellite and for converting that signal into anintermediate frequency signal. Satellite navigation signal receptioncomponent 102 is also used to sample the intermediate frequency signalsand acquire and track the signal received from the GNSS satellites inview. Satellite navigation signal reception component 102 is also usedto derive timing measurements from the intermediate frequency signal anddetermine pseudoranges, signal phases, and Doppler frequency shift datafrom the intermediate frequency signal.

In operation 220 of FIG. 2, a navigation data deriving componentdisposed within circuit 100 is utilized to derive position data and aclock time from the at least one signal. As discussed above, navigationdata deriving component 103 is for determining the geographic positionof circuit 100 based upon the data from satellite navigation signalreception component 102. Typically, that geographic position, orunprocessed navigation data such as received satellite navigationsignals, derived timing measurements, pseudoranges, signal phases, andDoppler frequency shift data is output by circuit 100. This informationcan be used to control a device based upon its geographic position, orto simply report the geographic position of a user of circuit 100.

In operation 230 of FIG. 2, a non-volatile memory component disposedwithin the circuit is utilized to store an encrypted data set describingthe boundaries of an exclusion zone. As described above, non-volatilememory 130 may comprise a read-only memory, or a programmablenon-volatile memory device used to store encrypted data set 131. In oneembodiment, encrypted data set 131 cannot be updated or changed whennon-volatile memory 130 is a read-only memory device. In anotherembodiment, encrypted data set 131 can be updated when stored in aprogrammable non-volatile memory device.

In operation 240 of FIG. 2, a data blocking component communicativelycoupled with the non-volatile memory device and the navigation dataderiving component is utilized to control the accessing of the encrypteddata set. As described above, navigation data deriving component 103 anddata control component 104 are communicatively coupled with non-volatilememory 130 via a data blocking component 120. Data blocking component120 controls the accessing of encrypted data set 131 from non-volatilememory 130. Data blocking component controls the accessing of encrypteddata set 131 based upon a comparison of checksum values, current dateand/or time, a comparison of encryption keys, or a combination thereof.In one embodiment, when data blocking component prevents the accessingof encrypted data set 131, which prevents a comparison of the currentgeographic position of circuit 100 with the exclusion zone descriptionstored as encrypted data set 131. In one embodiment, if a comparison ofthe present geographic position of circuit 100 with the exclusion zonedescription cannot be performed, data control component 104 prevents theoutput of a signal from circuit 100.

In operation 250 of FIG. 2, a data control component disposed withincircuit 100 is utilized to prevent the output of a signal from thecircuit 100 in response to an indication selected from the groupconsisting of: an indication that said circuit is located within theexclusion zone and an indication that output of said signal is notpermitted based upon the clock time. As discussed above, if data controlcomponent 104 receives an indication that circuit 100 is located withinan exclusion zone, data control component 104 prevents the output of asignal from navigation data deriving component 103 outside of circuit100. In so doing, data control component 104 renders circuit 100unusable as a position determining component within any exclusion zonesidentified by encrypted data set 131. Embodiments of the presenttechnology are advantageous over other exclusion zone solutions becauseit is implemented as a circuit rather than a software implementedsolution. This makes it more difficult to circumvent exclusion zonerestrictions, export control restrictions, or commercial restrictions,on the operation of a device based upon its geographic position.Additionally, embodiments of the present technology facilitateauthentication of the data set used to identify exclusion zones whichtherefore makes circumventing the geographic restrictions moredifficult.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram of an example circuit 300 for disabling acircuit for exclusion zone compliance in accordance with an embodimentof the present technology. In FIG. 3, a direct current (DC) power input305 is coupled with a thin wire trace 310. DC power input is configuredfor providing power from power coupling 129 to the rest of circuit 100.Also shown is a switch 325 coupled with DC power output 306 and with alow resistance bypass 320. In one embodiment, switch control 330controls the operation of switch 325.

During normal operating conditions, power from power coupling 129 passesthrough thin wire trace 310 to the rest of circuit 100 via DC poweroutput 306. Additionally, switch control 330 controls switch 325 suchthat it is open and does not permit current to pass to low resistancebypass 320. In one embodiment, when it is determined that circuit 100 iswithin an exclusion zone, data control component 104 generates a signalwhich is input to switch control 330. Switch control 330 then closesswitch 325 such that power is drawn from DC power output 306 to lowresistance bypass 320. In so doing sufficient current is drawn throughthin wire trace 310 that it burns out when switch 325 is closed. As aresult, power from power coupling 129 to the rest of circuit 100 ispermanently interrupted and circuit 100 cannot be subsequently used toreceive navigation signals, or to output data used for determining ageographic position. It is noted that thin wire trace 310 can beimplemented as a fusible link in one embodiment.

It is noted that a variation of circuit 300 may be inserted between datacontrol component 104 and position data serial port 105 such that inresponse to a signal from data control component 104 results in theclosing of switch 325 in one embodiment. This in turn permanently seversthe communicative coupling between data control component 104 andposition data serial port 105. As a result, navigation data from circuit100 is permanently interrupted and circuit 100 cannot be subsequentlyused to receive navigation signals, or to output data used fordetermining a geographic position.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram of an example non-volatile memory 130 inaccordance with one embodiment of the present technology. In oneembodiment, chipset operating data 410 is stored in a non-volatilememory area 420. In one embodiment, non-volatile memory area 420comprises a read-only memory device for permanently storing digital dataand instructions comprising an operating system for circuit 100. Inanother embodiment, non-volatile memory area 420 comprises aprogrammable memory device such as a Flash memory device, an EEPROMmemory device, or the like for persistent storage of digital data andinstructions for circuit 100. The use of programmable memory for thepersistent storage of data and instructions is widely implemented in thecomputing arts. One use of these devices is to store BIOS data andinstructions used to boot a computer or other electronic device.Programmable memory is increasingly used to store BIOS and similar databecause it has the additional advantage of permitting updates or changesto the operating system of the circuit via remote means which was notpossible with previously used Write Once, Read Many data storagedevices.

In FIG. 4, non-volatile memory 130 further comprises Flash memory area430. In one embodiment, Flash memory area 430 is not accessible fromoutside of non-volatile memory 130. In other words, Flash memory area430 cannot be reprogrammed or updated with new data once it has beenwritten. It is noted that Flash memory area 430 may implement anothertype of persistent memory in one embodiment of the present technology.In FIG. 4, non-volatile memory 130 further comprises an output gate 440from which digital data and instructions from non-volatile memory 130are output to other components of circuit 100.

In one embodiment, Flash memory area 430 stores a command which iswritten to output gate 440 in response to a signal from data controlcomponent 104 via input 450. For example, during normal operation ofnon-volatile memory 130, the gating function of output gate 440 iswritten as a logical “0” and digital data and instructions can be outputfrom non-volatile memory 130 via data output 455. However, if it isdetermined that circuit 100 is within an exclusion zone, data controlcomponent 104 outputs a signal to non-volatile memory 130 which is inputto Flash memory area 430 via input 450. In response to the signal fromdata control component 104, Flash memory area 430 writes a destructioncommand stored therein into output gate 440. In one embodiment, thedestruction command re-writes the gating function of output gate 440 toa logical “1” which inhibits the data output functioning of output gate440. Thus, the digital data and instructions comprising the operatingsystem of circuit 100 can no longer be output from non-volatile memory130. In so doing, circuit 100 is rendered unusable. Furthermore, becauseits operating system is no longer accessible, there is no way to enableoutput gate 440 and circuit 100 is thus rendered permanently disabled.It is noted that the destruction command can be written from Flashmemory 430 into output gate 440 in response to other conditions orcommands as well. For example, the detection of an unauthorizedoperating state, or of tampering with data or components of circuit 100,may also result in the writing of the destruction command from Flashmemory 430 into output gate 440.

Terrestrial-Signal Based Exclusion Zone Compliance

While embodiments of exclusion zone compliance which use satellite basednavigation systems are useful, there are times when satellite navigationsignals are not available such as in cities, or when the signal isobscured such as beneath foliage, inside of buildings. In cities, the“urban canyon effect” describes the phenomenon in which the radiosignals from navigation satellites can bounce off of and betweenbuildings which complicates acquisition and processing of the timingsignals from the satellites. Thus, at times it may be beneficial toprovide an alternate method for determining the geographic position of adevice. Additionally, many devices still are not equipped with GNSSreceivers and processing circuits.

Furthermore, at times the precision of a GNSS receiver may not be neededto enforce exclusion zone compliance. For example, in cases where anexclusion zone is as large as a metropolitan area, or a country, a lessprecise determination of the geographic position of a device may besufficient to enforce the exclusion zone. In embodiments of the presenttechnology, a circuit for exclusion zone compliance based uponterrestrial radio signals can be used to determine the geographicposition of a device.

In an embodiment, a terrestrial-based radio location system may beemployed instead of the GPS/GNSS positioning system. The use ofterrestrial-based radio signals as navigation aids is well known. Forexample, radio signals were developed and widely used during WWII. Oneexample of a terrestrial-based radio navigation system is the Long RangeNavigation (LORAN) system which was widely used until recently. Theprinciples of operation are based upon the difference of time-of-flight,or time-of-arrival, measurements between a transmitter and a receiverusing a reference time at the transmitter and receiver. Using thisinformation, a radial distance from the transmitter to the receiver canbe calculated. By calculating three radial distances from threetransmitters to the receiver, three radial distances are determined(e.g., as represented by a circle centered on each of the threetransmitters). The intersection point of these three circles representsthe geographic position of the receiver. This is process often referredto as “triangulation” or “multilateration.” Other methods are well-knownin the arts, including angle of arrival and time difference of arrival.Implementations of the LORAN system are described in U.S. Pat. No.3,743,754, titled “Loran Signal Synthesizer,” by Robert M. Eisenberg,U.S. Pat. No. 3,683,383, titled Loran Receiver-Indicator, by Sidney G.Knox, and U.S. Pat. No. 4,166,275, titled Loran Receiver System, bySheldon B. Michaels, Otis Philbrick, and Jeffrey Morris which areincorporated by reference in their entirety herein.

It is noted that the radio transmitters can be of any kind in accordancewith various embodiments. However, the radio transmitters most commonlyavailable today are based on transmissions from Frequency Modulated (FM)radio transmitters, television transmitters, Ultra-Wideband (UWB)transmitters, cellular transmitter/receivers at cell towers, or Wi-Fitransmitter/receivers located wherever a user so desires. Cellulartelephones have been manufactured for several years with the capabilityto triangulate their location based upon signals from nearby celltowertransmitters. A paper entitled “Overview of Radiolocation in CDMACellular Systems” was published in the IEEE Communications Magazine inApril 1998, explaining the details of cellular-based positioning systemsin accordance with embodiments. An identical process may be implementedin Wi-Fi systems, which comply with the 802.11 specification.

FIG. 10 shows the principles of estimating the position of a receiverbased upon time of flight or time of arrival measurements. In FIG. 10, aWiFi region 1010 is shown in which a receiver 1005 receives radiosignals from WiFi transmitters 1011, 1012, and 1013. Receiver 1005 islocated at a first distance 1011 a from WiFi transmitter 1011, a seconddistance 1012 a from WiFi transmitter 1012, and a third distance 1013 afrom WiFi transmitter 1013. Because the radio signal from each of WiFitransmitters 1011, 1012, and 1013 carries timing data, receiver 1005 candetermine distances 1011 a, 1012 a, and 1013 a based upon the timedifference between when the respective radio signals were transmittedand when they are received at receiver 1005. If receiver 1005 can accessinformation which provides the known location of WiFi transmitters 1011,1012, and 1013, it can determine a radius from each known location usingthe radii which were derived above. Receiver 1005 can then determine alocation at which all three radii overlap. This is the position at whichreceiver 1005 is located.

In a similar process, the position of receiver 1005 can be determinedusing cellular telephone transmissions. In FIG. 10, receiver 1005 islocated at a first distance 1021 a from WiFi transmitter 1021, a seconddistance 1022 a from WiFi transmitter 1022, and a third distance 1023 afrom WiFi transmitter 1023. Again, the radio signal from each of celltowers 1021, 1022, and 1023 carries timing data, receiver 1005 candetermine distances 1021 a, 1022 a, and 1023 a based upon the timedifference between when the respective radio signals were transmittedand when they are received at receiver 1005. If receiver 1005 can accessinformation which provides the known location of cell towers 1021, 1022,and 1023, it can determine a radius from each known location using theradii which were derived above. Receiver 1005 can then determine alocation at which all three radii overlap. This is the position at whichreceiver 1005 is located. It is appreciated that similar triangulationor multilateration can be accomplished using Frequency Modulated (FM)radio signals or television signals. Likewise, these techniques oftriangulation/multilateration can be utilized with a variety ofcombinations of mixed signal types. Some examples of such combinationsof mixed signal types include, but are not limited to: a cell towersignal, and two FM radio station signals; or a WiFi signal, a cell towersignal, and an FM radio station signal; or a cell phone tower signal, anFM radio station signal, and a television station signal.

With reference to FIG. 6, embodiments are comprised of computer-readableand computer-executable instructions that reside, for example, inelectronic device 600. It is appreciated that electronic device 600 ofFIG. 6 is intended as an example only and that embodiments can operatewithin a number of different electronic devices including embeddedcomputer systems, laptop computer systems, hand-held electronic devices,cellular telephones, and navigation devices.

In the present embodiment, electronic device 600 includes anaddress/data bus 601 for conveying digital information between thevarious components, a central processor unit (CPU) 602 for processingthe digital information and instructions, a volatile main memory 603comprised of volatile random access memory (RAM) for storing the digitalinformation and instructions, and a non-volatile read only memory (ROM)604 for storing information and instructions of a more permanent nature.In addition, electronic device 600 may also include a data storagedevice 605 (e.g., a magnetic, optical, floppy, or tape drive or thelike) for storing vast amounts of data. It should be noted that thesoftware program for performing terrestrial-signal based exclusion zonecompliance of in accordance with various embodiments can be stored involatile memory 603, data storage device 605 (e.g., software 611).

Devices which are optionally coupled to electronic device 600 include adisplay device 606 for displaying information to a user, analpha-numeric input device 607 (e.g., a keyboard, keypad, or the like),and a cursor control device 608 (e.g., mouse, trackball, light pen,etc.) for inputting data, selections, updates, etc. Electronic device600 can also include a mechanism for emitting an audible signal (notshown).

Returning still to FIG. 6, optional display device 606 of FIG. 6 may bea liquid crystal device, cathode ray tube, touchscreen, or other displaydevice suitable for creating graphic images and alpha-numeric charactersrecognizable to a user. Optional cursor control device 608 allows a userto dynamically signal the two dimensional movement of a visible symbol(cursor) on a display screen of display device 606. Many implementationsof cursor control device 608 are known in the art including a trackball,mouse, touch pad, joystick, or special keys on alpha-numeric input 607capable of signaling movement of a given direction or mannerdisplacement. Alternatively, it will be appreciated that a cursor can bedirected and/or activated via input from alpha-numeric input 607 usingspecial keys and key sequence commands. Alternatively, the cursor may bedirected and/or activated via input from a number of specially adaptedcursor directing devices.

Furthermore, electronic device 600 can include an input/output (I/O)signal unit (e.g., interface) 609 for interfacing with a peripheraldevice (not shown). As shown in FIG. 6, electronic device 600 furthercomprises an exclusion zone compliance circuit 100 which as describedabove with reference to FIGS. 1A-1H.

Electronic device 600 further comprises a wireless communication device610. Wireless communications device 610 is for transmitting andreceiving wireless messages (e.g., data and/or commands). In oneembodiment, wireless communications device 610 comprises a cellularwireless antenna (not shown) and a cellular wireless modem (not shown).In one embodiment, electronic device 600 sends and receives messagesusing the Short Message Service (SMS). However, electronic device 600 iswell suited to utilize other message formats as well such as the GlobalSystem for Mobile Communications (GSM) specification, or the GlobalPacket Radio Service (GPRS) specification. In one embodiment, wirelesscommunications device 610 is compliant with a Code Division MultipleAccess (CDMA) communication standard, or a variant thereof. Variants ofthe CDMA standard include, but are not limited to the CDMA-2000standard, the WCDMA standard, the HSPDA standard, the TD-CDMA standard,and the cdmaOne standard. In another embodiment, wireless communicationsdevice 610 is compliant with the Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA)standard. In another embodiment, wireless communications device 610 iscompliant with the Integrated Digital Enhanced Network (iDEN)specification. Additionally, other embodiments are well suited toimplement potential 4G networks such as the Worldwide Interoperabilityfor Microwave Access (WiMax) technology and the 3rd GenerationPartnership Project (3GPP) Long Term Evolution (LTE) technology.Wireless communications device 610 can also use standards-based mobileinternet protocols (IP) to provide interoperability between networks.

In one embodiment, wireless communication device 610 comprises awireless network communications device which can use Internet protocols,such as Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCPIP), packetswitching, Institute of Electronic and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)802.11 standard, Wireless Local Area Network (Wi Lan), IEEE 802.16standard (also commonly known as “WiMax”), and general packet radioservice (GPRS), and the like.

FIG. 7 is a block diagram of a circuit 700 for exclusion zone compliancein accordance with embodiments of the present technology. In embodimentsof the present technology, circuit 700 may be a component of a personalnavigation system, an in-vehicle navigation system for use in personaldriving or the like. In other embodiments, circuit 700 is not acomponent of a dedicated position determining device, but is a componentwhich provides position determining functionality for an electronicdevice. For example, cellular telephones, PDAs, and automobiles areincreasingly equipped with some form of GNSS or other type of positiondetermining capability in order to provide a user with geographicpositioning and position-based information. Alternatively, circuit 700may be coupled with another device to enforce exclusion zonerequirements for that device, or software or hardware or functionalitydisposed therein.

In one embodiment, circuit 700 comprises a terrestrial radio signalreception component 702 which is communicatively coupled with an antenna701. It is noted that while antenna 701 is shown disposed outside ofcircuit 700, it can also comprise a component of circuit 700 in anembodiment of the present technology. In one embodiment, terrestrialradio signal reception component 702 is configured to process receivedterrestrial radio signals. These signals can include, but are notlimited to, FM (Frequency Modulation) radio signals, television signals,cellular telephone signals, and wireless signals compliant with the IEEE802.11 standards.

Circuit 700 further comprises a navigation data deriving component 703which is communicatively coupled with terrestrial radio signal receptioncomponent 702 and with a position data serial port 705 via a datacontrol component 704. In embodiments of the present technology,navigation data deriving component 703 is for determining the geographicposition of the antenna 701 and the associated circuit 700 based uponthe data from terrestrial radio signal reception component 702.

In one embodiment, navigation data deriving component 703 is configuredto use a unique identifier of the transmission source of a receivedterrestrial radio signal to determine the geographic position of circuit700. For example, if radio signal received by antenna 701 comprises anFM radio signal, navigation data deriving component 703 can extractRadio Broadcast Data System (RDS) data. This data is broadcast on asubcarrier frequency and can include timing data, stationidentification, and programming information.

Using the station identification data, navigation data derivingcomponent 703 can access a database which correlates the stationidentification with the geographic coordinates of the transmitter forthat station. Navigation data deriving component 703 then compares thereceived unique identifier of the transmission source with the stationidentifications stored in the database to determine the identity of thetransmitter of the received terrestrial radio signal. In one embodiment,this database is stored within circuit 700 (e.g., second encrypted dataset 734). Alternatively, circuit 700 can access a remotely locateddatabase using wireless communications device 610 via a wirelesscommunications network. Navigation data deriving component 703 can thendetermine the location of the transmitter of a received terrestrialradio signal by associating the identification of the transmitter of thesignal with the known geographic position of that transmitter using thedatabase. In one embodiment, navigation data deriving component 703 candetermine that it is located within a given radius of the transmitterbased upon, for example, the known reception radius for that particularFM radio station. For example, navigation data deriving component 703could determine that circuit 700 is within 20 miles of the transmitterfor a particular received FM radio signal, but not determine thedirection to the transmitter. While the use of a single received radiosignal is insufficient to derive a direction to the transmission sourceof the received signal, an estimate which is accurate to within 20 milesmay be precise enough for the enforcement of exclusion zone restrictionsin some cases, especially as the size of the exclusion zone increases.

Furthermore, navigation data deriving component 703 can derive apseudorange to the transmitter of the received radio signal based uponthe timing data embedded within the RBDS signal. In other words,navigation data deriving component 703 can determine the delay betweenwhen the signal was transmitted and when it was received at circuit 700using the timing data in the RBDS signal. This can assist in generatinga more precise estimate of the position of circuit 700 by decreasing theradius to the known location of the transmitter of the received radiosignal.

In one embodiment, the timing information embedded in a plurality ofreceived RBDS signals or other terrestrial radio signals can be used todetermine the geographic position of circuit 700 with a greater degreeof precision than if a single received signal is used. That is to say,multiple terrestrial FM radio signals may be received and utilized bynavigation data deriving component 703 to triangulate or multilaterate aposition of circuit 700. Again, while it is possible that this derivedgeographic position is less precise than if a GNSS receiver is used, itis still sufficiently precise to determine the geographic position ofcircuit 700 and whether it is currently located within an exclusionzone.

In another embodiment, antenna 701 and terrestrial radio signalreception component 702 receive television broadcast signals which areused by navigation data deriving component 703. The use of receivedtelevision signals to determine the location of a device is advantageousin urban areas, and especially indoors, because television signals aretransmitted at a higher radiated power and because they are broadcast ata frequency which is less attenuated by buildings and otherobstructions. Additionally, the television signals are broadcast fromfixed locations having known positions and which are located much closerto the receiver (e.g., circuit 700) than a GNSS satellite. Furthermore,both digital and analog television broadcasts contain synchronizationsignals which can be used to determine the position of circuit 700 withgreater precision.

In one embodiment, navigation data deriving component 703 is configuredto extract the timing data from received television signals to derive apseudorange to the transmitter of the received television signal.Navigation data deriving component 703 then uses the stationidentification data from the received television signal to identify thetransmission source of the received signal. Again, navigation dataderiving component 703 can access an internal database, or a remotedatabase using wireless communications device 610, which correlates thestation identification with the geographic coordinates of thetransmitter for that station. Using this information, navigation dataderiving component can determine the geographic position of circuit 700and determine whether it is located within an exclusion zone based uponone received television signal, or can determine its position based upona plurality of received television signals(triangulation/multilateration). In one embodiment, navigation dataderiving component 703 generates a signal to data control component 704indicating that circuit 700 is located within an exclusion zone.

In one embodiment, terrestrial radio signal reception component 702 isconfigured to receive cellular telephone tower signals from antenna 701for processing. For example, terrestrial radio signal receptioncomponent 702 can determine the identity of a cellular telephone towerusing data embedded in the radio signal from that tower. Using thisinformation, navigation data deriving component 703 can access adatabase (e.g., second encrypted data set 734) and determine thegeographic location of that cellular telephone tower. Navigation dataderiving component 703 can then determine the geographic position ofcircuit 700 using this information. Again, navigation data derivingcomponent 703 can determine the geographic position of circuit 700 withgreater precision using a plurality of received signals from a pluralityof cellular telephone towers. Furthermore, navigation data derivingcomponent 703 can determine pseudoranges to each of the cellulartelephone towers based upon timing data embedded in the radio signal.This can facilitate determining the geographic position of circuit 700with greater precision. It is noted that the functions served by antenna701 and terrestrial radio signal reception component 702 can beperformed by wireless communication device 610 in one embodiment. In analternate embodiment, a separate receiver chipset may be incorporated toprovide the location determination function. FM receiver chipsets and TVbroadcast receiver chipsets are widely available.

In one embodiment, terrestrial radio signal reception component 702comprises a wireless transceiver compliant with various implementationsof the IEEE 802.11 standards. In one embodiment, terrestrial radiosignal reception component 702 can determine the identity (e.g., the IPaddress, name of the WiFi node, etc.) of a WiFi node with which it iscommunicating. Navigation data deriving component 703 can then comparethe IP address with the known location of that WiFi transceiver todetermine the geographic position of circuit 700. Given thecomparatively small broadcast radius of most WiFi nodes, the geographicposition of circuit 700 can be determined with acceptable precision,from a single WiFi signal, in determining whether it is located withinan exclusion zone. However, triangulation/multilateration using aplurality of WiFi signals can be accomplished as well. Again, it isnoted that the functions served by antenna 701 and terrestrial radiosignal reception component 702 can be performed by wirelesscommunication device 610 in one embodiment.

In one embodiment, circuit 700 comprises a non-volatile memory 730 forpersistent storage of digital information and instructions for circuit700. In one embodiment, non-volatile memory 730 is used for storing theoperating system for circuit 700. In one embodiment, this may include,but is not limited to, instructions and data for terrestrial radiosignal reception component 702, navigation data deriving component 703,data control component 704, and data blocking component 720. In oneembodiment, non-volatile memory 730 comprises a Flash memory asdescribed above with reference to FIG. 4, or a field-programmable gatearray (FPGA).

In one embodiment, data control component 704 is for blocking the outputof a signal from navigation data deriving component 703 in response todetermining that circuit 700 is located within an exclusion zone. In oneembodiment, navigation data deriving component 703 compares the currentgeographic position of circuit 700 against a data set (e.g., encrypteddata set 731) of coordinates of at least one exclusion zone. In anotherembodiment, data control component 704 receives the current geographicposition of circuit 700 from navigation data deriving component 703 andaccesses the encrypted data set 731 for the coordinates defining theexclusion zone(s). Data control component 704 then determines whethercircuit 700 is currently located within an exclusion zone. For thepurposes of the present technology, an exclusion zone is a geographicregion in which GNSS positioning data is not to be made accessible,outside the confines of the packaged circuit of circuit 700.

In response to an indication that circuit 700 is currently locatedwithin an exclusion zone, data control component 704 blocks the outputof a signal from navigation data deriving component 703. In embodimentsof the present technology, data control component 704 can block theoutput of terrestrial radio signals received from antenna 701,unprocessed position data, or a geographic position derived bynavigation data deriving component 703. In so doing, circuit 700 is nolonger usable for supplying geographic position data while it is locatedwithin an exclusion zone.

In one embodiment, data control component 704 will permanently block theoutput of a signal from navigation data deriving component 703 inresponse to an indication that circuit 700 is located within anexclusion zone. For example in one embodiment, data control component704 is configured such that it cannot be reset once it blocks the outputof a signal from navigation data deriving component 703. In other words,once data control component 704 blocks the output of a signal fromnavigation data deriving component 703, it cannot be reset to laterfacilitate conveying a signal from navigation data deriving component703. Thus, once it has been determined that circuit 700 is within anexclusion zone, it is permanently disabled and cannot be used to receivenavigation signals, or to output data used for determining a geographicposition. In another embodiment, data control component 704 isconfigured to output a signal to another device (e.g., circuit 300 ofFIG. 3) which will disable circuit 700, or otherwise prevent it fromoutputting a signal. In another embodiment, data control component 704is configured to output a signal to non-volatile memory 730 such that itcan no longer output the data and instructions necessary for circuit 700to function as described above with reference to FIG. 4. Alternatively,if non-volatile memory 730 comprises a FPGA, data control component caninitiate a process which re-programs the FPGA and renders it unable tooutput the data and instructions necessary for circuit 700 to function.For example, circuit 700 may apply a programming voltage to the FPGA,such that one or more portions (or all) of the FPGA can be destroyed orrendered inoperable when more fusible links or circuit features withinthe FPGA can be reprogrammed or “blown” by the applied programmingvoltage.

In another embodiment, data control component 704 only blocks the outputof a signal from navigation data deriving component 703 while circuit700 is currently located in an exclusion zone. In other words, ifcircuit 700 is moved from an exclusion zone to an area outside of theexclusion zone, data control component 704 will permit navigation dataderiving component 703 to output a signal via position data serial port705. It is noted that data control component 704 may be implementedwithin navigation data deriving component 703 in one embodiment of thepresent technology.

In another embodiment, data control component 704 can be used to blockthe output of other data from circuit 700. For example, data fromelectronic device 600 can be routed through circuit 700 to controland/or disable various functions when electronic device 600 is locatedwithin an exclusion zone. For example, in some countries the sending ofencrypted text messages is prohibited. In one embodiment, encrypted textmessages can be routed through circuit 700 via encrypted data set input785 and encrypted data set output 786. If it is determined that circuit700 is located within an exclusion zone (e.g., a country that does notpermit encrypted text messaging) the output of encrypted text messagesfrom circuit 700 is blocked by data control component 704. In theexample of a cellular telephone, received radio signals from a cellulartransmitter, or radio signals to be transmitted by electronic device 600can be routed through circuit 700 and blocked when it is determined thatcircuit 700 is located in an exclusion zone. In another embodiment, datacontrol component 704 can output a signal via encrypted data set output786 which is received by processor 602 of electronic device 600. Thissignal will indicate to processor 602 that electronic device 600 islocated within an exclusion zone. Using this information, processor 602can control which functions are permitted. Again using the example of acellular telephone, in response to a signal from circuit 700 a cellulartelephone (e.g., electronic device 600) can block the reception of radiosignals from a cellular telephone transmitter, or block the transmissionof radio signals, thus rendering the cellular telephone unusable whilelocated in the exclusion zone.

In one embodiment, encrypted data set 731 and second encrypted data set734 are stored in a non-volatile memory 730. In one embodiment,non-volatile memory 730 comprises a read-only memory (ROM) device. Inother words, encrypted data set 731 and second encrypted data set 734are permanently stored in non-volatile memory 730 and cannot be updated.In another embodiment, non-volatile memory 730 comprises a programmablememory device such as a Flash memory or the like. Thus, in oneembodiment, encrypted data set 731 can be updated to include additionalexclusion zones as they are identified, or to remove exclusion zones asdesired. Additionally, second encrypted data set 734 can be updated toadd or remove transmission sources, or to add data which can furtherrefine determining the position of circuit 700.

In the embodiment of FIG. 7, navigation data deriving component 703 anddata control component 704 are communicatively coupled with non-volatilememory 730 via a data blocking component 720. Data blocking component720 controls the accessing of encrypted data set 731 and secondencrypted data set 734 from non-volatile memory 730. In general, datablocking component 704 is configured to authenticate the integrity ofencrypted data set 731 and prevent alteration of the exclusion zones. Asshown in FIG. 7, data blocking component 720 comprises a verificationdata determining component 721, and a verification data comparisoncomponent 722, which are used to verify authenticity of data. Theverification data value may be a checksum value or other well knownverification data such as, but not limited to: a hash value, a parityvalue, or a value or result output from carrying out an errordetection/correction technique such as Hamming code.

In one embodiment, verification data determining component 721 is fordetermining the verification data value 721 a of encrypted data set 731and for determining the verification data value 721 b of secondencrypted data set 734. This verification data value 721 a, or 721 b, isthen passed to verification data comparing component 722 which comparesthe verification data value 721 a/721 b with a verification data value732 stored in non-volatile memory 730 to verify authenticity. In oneembodiment, verification data value 732 is a verification data value ofencrypted data set 731 when it is first stored in non-volatile memory730. In one embodiment, verification data value 737 is a verificationdata value of second encrypted data set 734 when it is first stored innon-volatile memory 730. If encrypted data set 731, or second encrypteddata set 734, is then altered after it has been stored in non-volatilememory 730, verification data value 721 a, or verification data value721 b respectively, will no longer match the verification data value 732as determined by verification data determining component 721. Thus,verification data comparing component 722 can determine if encrypteddata set 731, or second encrypted data set 734, has been altered afterit has been stored in non-volatile memory 730.

In one embodiment of the present technology, if verification datacomparing component 722 determines that verification data value 721 adoes not match the verification data value 732, data blocking component720 will prevent accessing of encrypted data set 731 by navigation dataderiving component 703 and/or data control component 704. Similarly, ifverification data comparing component 722 determines that verificationdata value 721 b does not match the verification data value 737, datablocking component 720 will prevent accessing of second encrypted dataset 734 by navigation data deriving component 703 and/or data controlcomponent 704. In one embodiment, if data control component 704 cannotaccess encrypted data set 731 or second encrypted data set 734, itautomatically blocks the output of a signal from navigation dataderiving component 703. In so doing, embodiments of the presenttechnology can authenticate the integrity of encrypted data set 731 andprevent alteration of the exclusion zones. Additionally, embodiments ofthe present technology can authenticate the integrity of secondencrypted data set 734 and prevent alteration of the database whichprovides the geographic position of terrestrial radio transmitters.Thus, if an entity tries to circumvent the exclusion zone features ofcircuit 700 by changing the coordinates of one or more exclusion zones,data blocking component 720 renders circuit 700 unusable becausenecessary data for determining the geographic position of circuit 700 isnot accessible. Similarly, if an entity tries to circumvent theexclusion zone features of circuit 700 by changing the coordinates ofone or more terrestrial radio transmitters, data blocking component 720renders circuit 700 unusable because necessary data for determining thegeographic position of circuit 700 is not accessible.

In the embodiment of FIG. 7, data blocking component 720 comprises adate comparison component 723 for comparing a date associated withencrypted data set 731 with a second date corresponding to a valid dataset. In one embodiment of the present technology, a date 731 a isassociated with encrypted data set 731 which facilitates determiningwhether a valid, or current, data set is used to define exclusion zones.It is noted that date 731 a can comprise a day, week, month, and year inone embodiment. In one embodiment, encrypted data set 731 is required tobe periodically updated in order to reflect any changes to thecoordinates of the exclusion zones. As described above, this may includeadding more exclusion zones, or removing some exclusion zones. In oneembodiment, an updated data set may be received via a wireless network.In another embodiment, an updated data set may require that a removabledata storage medium (e.g., a Smart Card, Universal Serial Bus (USB)drive, SmartMedia card, MultiMedia card, MicroDrive™ device,CompactFlash™ device, MemoryStick device, SecureDigital card, opticaldata storage device, or the like) is communicatively coupled withnavigation data deriving component 703 via encrypted data set input 128.Circuit 700 can receive clock time data via encrypted data set inputs728 and/or 785 (e.g., from processor 602 of electronic device 600), orfrom signals embedded within the received terrestrial radio signal.Additionally, in the embodiment of FIG. 7, data blocking component 720comprises a time comparison component 727 for comparing a timeassociated with encrypted data set 731 with a second time correspondingto a valid data set.

In one embodiment, date comparison component 723 and time comparisoncomponent 727 can be used to prevent the output of time sensitive datavia circuit 700. For example, an exclusion zone list may only be validuntil a certain date or time. In one embodiment, the exclusion zone listis encrypted and stored in non-volatile memory 730 as an encrypted dataset (e.g., encrypted data set 731). In one embodiment, date comparisoncomponent 723 and/or time comparison component 727 compares the currentdate and/or time with a date or time attribute of the encrypted data set731 which describes when the encrypted data set 731 expires, or is nolonger to be made available. In one embodiment, when date comparisoncomponent 723 and/or time comparison component 727 determines that theencrypted data set 731 has expired, it will generate a signal to datacontrol component 704. In response, data control component 704 blocksthe output of the encrypted data set 731. In one embodiment, datecomparison component 723 and/or time comparison component 727 flags theencrypted data set 731 which marks it as an expired data set.

In one embodiment of the present technology, date comparison component723 determines whether date 731 a corresponds with a valid data set.Similarly, time comparison component 727 determines whether time 731 c,which is associated with encrypted data set 731, corresponds with avalid data set. For example, if there is a requirement to updateencrypted data set 731 monthly, date comparison component 723 determineswhether encrypted data set 731 has been updated within the last month.Similarly, if there is a requirement that encrypted data set 731 expiresat a certain time, or is not to be accessed during a specified timeperiod, time comparison component 727 determines whether encrypted dataset 731 has expired, or cannot be accessed at the current time. In oneembodiment, if date comparison component 723 and/or time comparisoncomponent 727 determines that encrypted data set 731 is not a valid dataset, data blocking component 720 will prevent accessing of encrypteddata set 731 by navigation data deriving component 703 and/or datacontrol component 704. Again, this will prevent the operation of circuit700. Thus, if an entity tries to circumvent an exclusion zonerestriction by using an older data set, circuit 700 will be renderedunusable. Additionally, data blocking component 720 may also preventaccessing of software instructions 733 by navigation data derivingcomponent 703 and/or data control component 704 as well. In embodimentsof the present technology, software instructions 733 may comprise anencryption/decryption algorithm used to encrypt and/or decrypt encrypteddata set 731.

In FIG. 7, circuit 700 further comprises an encryption key comparator724 for comparing a stored encryption key 725 with an encryption key 731b associated with encrypted data set 731. In one embodiment, encrypteddata set 731 is encrypted using standard encryption techniques, e.g.,Message Digest algorithm 5 (MD-5), Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA), etc. Inone embodiment, a private key (e.g., encryption key 725) is loaded intocircuit 700 during production. Thus, encryption key 725 is inaccessibleto a user of circuit 700. In one embodiment, encryption key 725 maycomprise a portion of a larger encrypted sequence stored in circuit 700.For example, a 64-bit sequence may be stored. However, encryption key725 may only comprise a 32-bit sequence within that 64-bit sequence.This makes it harder for an end user to determine what portion of thestored sequence is the actual encryption key 725. It is noted thatencryption key 725 may be stored in navigation data deriving component703, non-volatile memory 730, or volatile memory 190 in embodiments ofthe present technology. It is further noted the volatile memory 190 canalso be used to store data and instructions for navigation data derivingcomponent 703 and data control component 704. It is noted that a similaroperation can be performed using second encryption key 726 which iscompared with encryption key 734 b associated with second encrypted dataset 734.

In one embodiment of the present technology, encryption key comparator724 compares stored encryption key 725 with encryption key 731 b priorto loading encrypted data set 731 into non-volatile memory 730. In oneembodiment, encryption key comparator 724 compares second encryption key726 with encryption key 734 b prior to loading second encrypted data set734 into non-volatile memory 730. In one embodiment, encryption key 731b is used to encrypt encrypted data set 731 prior to it being loadedinto non-volatile memory 730 via encrypted data set input 128. In oneembodiment, stored encryption key 725, second encryption key 726,encryption key 731 b, and encryption key 734 b are encrypted themselves.In one embodiment, if stored encryption key 725 does not matchencryption key 731 b which is within encrypted data set 731, datablocking component 720 prevents the loading of encrypted data set 731into non-volatile memory 730. Similarly, in one embodiment, if storedencryption key 726 does not match encryption key 734 b which is withinsecond encrypted data set 734, data blocking component 720 prevents theloading of second encrypted data set 734 into non-volatile memory 730.If stored encryption key 725 does match encryption key 731 b which iswithin encrypted data set 731, encryption key 725 is used to decryptencrypted data set 731 prior to its being accessed by navigation dataderiving component 703 and/or data control component 704. Thisfacilitates authenticating encrypted data set 731 prior to loading itinto non-volatile memory 730. Similarly, if stored encryption key 726does match encryption key 734 b which is within encrypted data set 734,encryption key 726 is used to decrypt encrypted data set 734 prior toits being accessed by navigation data deriving component 703 and/or datacontrol component 704.

In FIG. 7, circuit 700 comprises an encrypted data set input 785 and anencrypted data set output 786 which are communicatively coupled via datacontrol component 704. In one embodiment, circuit 700 can be used tocontrol the output of data from a device to which circuit iscommunicatively coupled. For example, circuit 700 can be communicativelycoupled with a cellular telephone, a handheld computer system such as aPersonal Digital Assistant (PDA), a laptop computer system, a generalpurpose computer system, or other electronic device. In one embodiment,data from a device to which circuit 700 is coupled passes throughcircuit 700 prior to its output. Thus, data cannot be displayed,downloaded, shared, copied, or accessed unless it passes via circuit 700first. In one embodiment, circuit 700 can be used to control the outputof data from an electronic device to which it is coupled. For example,in one embodiment circuit 700 can be used to prevent the output of databased upon the geographic position determined by navigation dataderiving component 703. In other words, if it is determined that circuit700 is within an exclusion zone, the output of data from circuit 700will be blocked by data control component 704.

In one embodiment, the data blocked by data control component 704comprises, but is not limited to, navigation data from navigation dataderiving component 703, data stored in volatile memory 190, data storedin non-volatile memory 730, or data which is input to circuit 700 viaencrypted data set input 165. In one embodiment, the encryption key usedto decrypt data input from encrypted data input 785 is stored in circuit700. As described above, circuit can be used to decrypt an encrypteddata set determining whether a stored data set has been alteredsubsequent to its being stored in circuit 700. It is noted that there isno requirement for data input via encrypted data set input 785 to beencrypted in one embodiment. Again, the data described above may beblocked from being output by circuit 700 based upon the date, or currenttime, or based upon the speed at which circuit 700 is moving, or acombination thereof in one embodiment. The use of date, time, and/orspeed to determine whether data is output by circuit 700 can be used inconjunction with a geographic position of circuit 700 in one embodiment.

In FIG. 7, circuit 700 comprises a speed determining component 770. Inone embodiment, speed determining component 770 is configured todetermine the speed of circuit 700. In one embodiment, speed determiningcomponent 770 receives position data from navigation data derivingcomponent 703 and determines if circuit is exceeding a pre-determinedspeed threshold. For example, in one embodiment speed determiningcomponent 770 can receive successive measurements of the geographicposition of circuit 700 from navigation data deriving component 703.Based upon the time interval of the successive measurements ofgeographic position, speed determining component 770 can then determinethe speed of circuit 700. It is noted that other methods may be used byspeed determining component 770 as well. For example, speed determiningcomponent 770 may also be configured to determine the speed of circuit700 based upon an analysis of the Doppler shift of received terrestrialradio signals due to motion of circuit 700. The speed of circuit 700 iscompared with a pre-determined speed threshold to determine if circuit700 is moving, or is moving faster than the speed threshold. It is notedthat the speed threshold can be set to comply with export controlregulations. For example, in one embodiment the speed threshold is setat a minimum of 600 meters/second. It is noted that the speed thresholdcan be set at a limit lower than 600 meters/second. For example, ifspeed threshold is set at a speed of 8 miles per hour, it may be assumedthat circuit 700 is disposed in a moving vehicle when its speed exceeds8 miles per hour. Alternatively, it may be assumed that the user ofcircuit 700 is engaged in an activity which requires a greater attentionto safety. In one embodiment, speed determining component 770 usessignal generator 775 to generate a signal to data control component 704when the speed of circuit 700 exceeds the speed threshold. In responseto the signal from speed determining component 770 data controlcomponent 704 blocks the output of a signal from circuit 700.

In FIG. 7, data blocking component 720 comprises verification datadetermining component 721, verification data value 721 a, verificationdata comparison component 722, date comparison component 723, encryptionkey comparator 724, and encryption key 725. Circuit 700 furthercomprises encrypted data set input 785 and an encrypted data set output786. Circuit 700 further comprises speed determining component 770. InFIG. 7, circuit 700 further comprises an altitude limiting component195. In one embodiment, altitude limiting component 195 is configured toreceive an indication of the altitude of circuit 700 from navigationdata deriving component 703 and for comparing that altitude with astored altitude threshold value. It is well known in the art that a GNSSreceiver (e.g., navigation data deriving component 703) can also derivethe altitude of a device based upon a plurality of received satellitenavigation signals. In the embodiment of FIG. 7, altitude limitingcomponent 195 generates a signal when the altitude of circuit 700exceeds a pre-set altitude threshold. As an example, export controlregulations have restricted the export of navigation devices to deviceswith an altitude limit of no more than 18,000 meters. Thus, altitudelimiting component 195 can be configured to generate a signal when itdetermines that the altitude of circuit 700 exceeds 18,000 meters. It isnoted that the altitude threshold can be set to a lower altitude if sodesired. In one embodiment, the altitude threshold cannot be modifiedafter manufacture. In response to the signal generated by altitudelimiting component 195, data control component 704 blocks the output ofa signal from circuit 700.

It is noted that data blocking component 720 may comprise othercombinations of components described above with reference to FIGS. 1C,1D, and 1E. For example, in one embodiment data blocking component 720comprises verification data determining component 721, verification datavalue 721 a, verification data comparison component 722, and datecomparison component 723. In one embodiment, data blocking component 720comprises verification data determining component 721, verification datavalue 721 a, verification data comparison component 722, encryption keycomparator 724, and encryption key 725. In one embodiment, data blockingcomponent 720 comprises date comparison component 723, encryption keycomparator 724, and encryption key 725. It is further noted that circuit700 can comprise multiple implementations of components described above.For example, one terrestrial radio signal reception component 702 can beconfigured for receiving and processing FM radio signals while a secondterrestrial radio signal reception component 702 can be configured forreceiving and processing television signals. Additionally, multipleimplementations of non-volatile memory 730, data blocking component 720,and data control component 704 can be used in accordance with variousembodiments. In another embodiment, components of circuit 100 (e.g.,satellite navigation signal reception component 102 as well asassociated data and instructions) can be disposed on circuit 700 toallow exclusion zone enforcement based upon satellite or terrestrialradio signals on a single circuit.

Thus, embodiments of the present technology can facilitate the export ofan electronic device and/or data accessible via circuit 700 whilereducing the likelihood that it can be misused by, for example,commercial entities, rogue nations, or other groups. Circuit 700 mayoperate anywhere in the world and the exclusionary zone may be locatedanywhere in the world. In another embodiment, sensitive data will not beaccessible unless circuit 700 is located outside of an exclusion zone.In another embodiment, time sensitive data will not be accessible viacircuit 700 when the time period for accessing that data has expired. Inanother embodiment, circuit 700 can be used to prevent the accessing ofdata, including geographic data, or data used to determine a geographicposition, if circuit 700 is moving, or is moving faster than apre-determined speed threshold. This facilitates implementing weaponsproliferation controls as circuit 700 cannot be altered for use as, forexample, a weapons guidance system, or used in a manner whichcircumvents a commercial agreement. Thus, even if an unintended thirdparty should gain control of a properly exported version of circuit 700,that third party cannot use or alter circuit 700 for use within adesignated exclusion zone. In another embodiment, circuit 700 can beused to control which functions of an electronic device are permittedbased upon its geographic position. Additionally, in embodiments of thepresent technology, the designated exclusion zones may be dynamicallyupdated to reflect changed relations. Thus, it is also possible toquickly redefine one or more of the exclusion zones to permit operationof circuit 700 within that zone. For example, if it is determined that anation or region is to no longer be excluded from using circuit 700, thedefinition of which geographic regions are considered exclusion zonescan be updated to reflect the new status of that nation. Alternatively,if a nation decides to permit or limit the use of a given technology,the exclusion zones defined in circuit 700 can be updated to reflectthose changes.

FIG. 8 is a flowchart of a method 800 for enforcing exclusion zonecompliance in accordance with an embodiment of the present technology.In operation 801, a terrestrial radio signal, comprising a uniqueidentification of a transmission source of the terrestrial radio signal,is received by a terrestrial radio signal reception component of anexclusion zone circuit. As described above, terrestrial radio signalreception component can utilize a variety of terrestrial-based radiosignals to assist in establishing the geographic position of circuit700. These can include, but are not limited to, cellular telephonesignals, FM radio signals, television signals, and wireless signalscompliant with the IEEE 802.11 standards.

In operation 802, a data set is accessed comprising the uniqueidentification of the transmission source and a known geographicposition of the transmission source. The received unique identificationof the transmission source is compared with the station identificationof the transmission source stored in the data set. In one embodiment,navigation data deriving component 703 can initiate communications witha database which correlates the unique identification of the transmitterof a received terrestrial radio signal with the known geographicposition of that transmitter. In one embodiment the database is aremotely located database which can be accessed via a wirelesscommunications network using wireless communication device 610. Inanother embodiment, the database is stored within electronic device 600.In one embodiment, the database is stored within non-volatile memory 730as an encrypted data set (e.g., second encrypted data set 734). In oneembodiment, navigation data deriving component 703 compares the receivedunique identification of the transmission source with the stationidentifications stored in the data set and determines which stationidentification matches the received unique identification. When a matchis detected, navigation data deriving component 703 then retrieves theknown geographic position of the transmission source for deriving theposition of circuit 700.

In operation 803, a geographic position of the exclusion zone compliancecircuit is derived based upon the known geographic position of thetransmission source. As described above, navigation data derivingcomponent 703 is configured to determine the geographic position ofcircuit 700 based upon the terrestrial radio signal received and thegeographic position of the transmitter of the received radio signal. Inone embodiment, determining the geographic position of circuit 700comprises determining that circuit 700 is within a given radius of thetransmitter of the received radio signal. In another embodiment,navigation data deriving component 703 can use timing data embeddedwithin the received terrestrial radio signal to determine the geographicposition of circuit 700. Furthermore, navigation data deriving component703 can utilize a plurality of received terrestrial radio signals todetermine the geographic position of circuit 700 with greater precision(e.g., by triangulation).

In operation 804, a non-volatile memory component is used to store anencrypted data set describing boundaries of an exclusion zone. Asdescribed above, non-volatile memory 730 is used to store encrypted datadescribing the boundaries of exclusion zones and can also storeencrypted data which correlates the unique identification of thetransmitter of a received terrestrial radio signal with the knowngeographic position of that transmitter. This helps to ensure theintegrity of the data to prevent circumventing exclusion zoneenforcement.

In operation 805, a data blocking component is used to control theaccessing of the encrypted data set. As described above, data blockingcomponent 720 controls accessing encrypted data, and other data, storedon non-volatile memory. Again, this helps to ensure the integrity of thedata stored in non-volatile memory 730 to prevent circumventingexclusion zone enforcement.

In operation 806, a data control component is used to block the outputof a signal from the exclusion zone compliance circuit in response to anindication that the exclusion zone compliance circuit is located withinan exclusion zone. As described above, data control component isconfigured to block the output of a signal when it is determined thatexclusion zone compliance circuit 700 is within an exclusion zone. Inone embodiment, data from electronic device 600 can be routed throughcircuit 700 to prevent the output of data, or to control functions ofelectronic device 600, when electronic device 600 is located within anexclusion zone. In another embodiment, data control component 704 canoutput a signal to processor 602 when circuit 700 is within an exclusionzone. This permits processor 602 to control functions of electronicdevice 600 based upon whether electronic device 600 is within anexclusion zone.

FIG. 9 is a flowchart of a method 900 for enforcing exclusion zonecompliance in accordance with an embodiment of the present technology.In operation 901, it is determined that a satellite navigation componentcannot derive a geographic position within a specified parameter. In oneembodiment, if processor 602 of FIG. 6 determines that exclusion zonecompliance circuit 100 cannot derive a geographic position of electronicdevice 600 within a specified parameter, it will shift enforcement ofexclusion zone compliance to circuit 700. Examples of parameters used todetermine whether circuit 100 can derive a geographic position in asatisfactory manner include, but are not limited to, determining ifnavigation satellite signals can be received by circuit 100, whether thesignal strength of the signals is sufficient, and the amount of time ittakes for circuit 100 to derive a geographic position, determining thatcircuit 100 is disposed within a pre-determined geographic area, anddetermining that the velocity of circuit 100 exceeds a pre-determinedvelocity. If processor 602 determines that one of these parameters isnot met, it can shift control of exclusion zone compliance to circuit700. In another embodiment, when satellite navigation signal receptionis implemented on circuit 700, navigation data deriving component 703may determine that the geographic position of circuit 700 cannot bedetermined within desired parameters and switch to using terrestrialradio signal reception component 702 instead.

In operation 902, a terrestrial radio signal, comprising a uniqueidentification of a transmission source of the terrestrial radio signal,is received by a terrestrial radio signal reception component of anexclusion zone circuit. As described above, terrestrial radio signalreception component can utilize a variety of terrestrial-based radiosignals to assist in establishing the geographic position of circuit700. These can include, but are not limited to, cellular telephonesignals, FM radio signals, television signals, and wireless signalscompliant with the IEEE 802.11 standards.

In operation 903, a data set is accessed comprising the uniqueidentification of the transmission source and a known geographicposition of the transmission source. The received unique identificationof the transmission source is compared with the station identificationof the transmission source stored in the data set. In one embodiment,navigation data deriving component 703 can initiate communications witha database which correlates the unique identification of the transmitterof a received terrestrial radio signal with the known geographicposition of that transmitter. In one embodiment the database is aremotely located database which can be accessed via a wirelesscommunications network using wireless communication device 610. Inanother embodiment, the database is stored within electronic device 600.In one embodiment, the database is stored within non-volatile memory 730as an encrypted data set (e.g., second encrypted data set 734). In oneembodiment, navigation data deriving component 703 compares the receivedunique identification of the transmission source with the stationidentifications stored in the data set and determines which stationidentification matches the received unique identification. When a matchis detected, navigation data deriving component 703 then retrieves theknown geographic position of the transmission source for deriving theposition of circuit 700.

In operation 904, a geographic position of the exclusion zone compliancecircuit is derived based upon the known geographic position of thetransmission source. As described above, navigation data derivingcomponent 703 is configured to determine the geographic position ofcircuit 700 based upon the terrestrial radio signal received and thegeographic position of the transmitter of the received radio signal. Inone embodiment, determining the geographic position of circuit 700comprises determining that circuit 700 is within a given radius of thetransmitter of the received radio signal. In another embodiment,navigation data deriving component 703 can use timing data embeddedwithin the received terrestrial radio signal to determine the geographicposition of circuit 700. Furthermore, navigation data deriving component703 can utilize a plurality of received terrestrial radio signals todetermine the geographic position of circuit 700 with greater precision.

In operation 905, a non-volatile memory component is used to store anencrypted data set describing boundaries of an exclusion zone. Asdescribed above, non-volatile memory 730 is used to store encrypted datadescribing the boundaries of exclusion zones and can also storeencrypted data which correlates the unique identification of thetransmitter of a received terrestrial radio signal with the knowngeographic position of that transmitter. This helps to ensure theintegrity of the data to prevent circumventing exclusion zoneenforcement.

In operation 906, a data blocking component is used to control theaccessing of the encrypted data set. As described above, data blockingcomponent 720 controls accessing encrypted data, and other data, storedon non-volatile memory. Again, this helps to ensure the integrity of thedata stored in non-volatile memory 730 to prevent circumventingexclusion zone enforcement.

In operation 907, a data control component is used to block the outputof a signal from the exclusion zone compliance circuit in response to anindication that the exclusion zone compliance circuit is located withinan exclusion zone. As described above, data control component isconfigured to block the output of a signal when it is determined thatexclusion zone compliance circuit 700 is within an exclusion zone. Inone embodiment, data from electronic device 600 can be routed throughcircuit 700 to prevent the output of data, or to control functions ofelectronic device 600, when electronic device 600 is located within anexclusion zone. In another embodiment, data control component 704 canoutput a signal to processor 602 when circuit 700 is within an exclusionzone. This permits processor 602 to control functions of electronicdevice 600 based upon whether electronic device 600 is within anexclusion zone.

FIG. 11 is a high level functional block diagram of an electronic device1100 which includes features of a circuit for implementing exclusionzone compliance, in accordance with various embodiments of the presenttechnology. Electronic device 1100 may, in various embodiments carry outone or more or all of the operations described flow chart 800 and/or oneor more or all of the operations described in flow chart 900.

By way of example and not of limitation, in various embodiments,electronic device 1100 may be: a position determining device (e.g., asurveying instrument), a personal navigation device, a navigation devicecoupled with a vehicle, a personal digital assistant, a cellulartelephone, a VOIP (voice over internet protocol) telephone, a personalcomputer, a net book, a tablet computer, a hand held multimedia device,a pager, or some of the preceding electronic devices. As illustrated,electronic device 1100 includes one or more terrestrial radio receivingcomponents 702 (e.g., one or more of Terrestrial radio receiver 702A(which receives FM and/or television signals); cellular telephonetransceiver 702B; and WiFi transceiver 702C). Electronic device 1100also includes a processor 602 (e.g., a microcontroller ormicroprocessor), an input output signal unit 609 (which may be used forinput/output of encrypted data sets or other data such as positionaldata), a navigation data determining component 703 (which may includedsome or all features of navigation determining component 203), a datacontrol component 704 (which may include some or all features of datacontrol component 104, a data blocking component 720 (which may includesome or all features of data blocking component 120), a non-volatilememory 730 (which may include some or all features of volatile memory130), and a volatile memory 790 (which may include some or all featuresof volatile memory 190). In some embodiments, electronic device mayadditionally include one or more of GNSS receiver 180, display device106, and limiting components 770 and/or 795 (which may include some orall features of speed determining component 170 and/or altitude limiting195).

In an electronic device such as electronic device 1100, multiple typesof position determination may be utilized in a hybrid positiondetermining approach. For example, electronic device may initiallyattempt to determine position utilizing one or more received WiFisignals and then alternatively or additionally determine positionutilizing received cell tower signal(s), received FM radio signal(s),and/or received television station signal(s), or some combinationthereof. In some embodiments this hybrid approach to positiondetermination also utilizes received GNSS signals, when available andwhen electronic device 1100 is equipped with GNSS receiver 190.

Embodiments of the present technology, terrestrial-signal basedexclusion zone compliance, are thus described. While the presenttechnology has been described in particular embodiments, it should beappreciated that the present technology should not be construed aslimited by such embodiments, but rather construed according to thefollowing claims.

1. An exclusion zone compliance circuit, said circuit comprising: aterrestrial radio signal reception component configured for receiving aterrestrial radio signal, said terrestrial radio signal comprising aunique identification of a transmission source of said terrestrial radiosignal; a non-volatile memory component configured for storing anencrypted data set describing boundaries of an exclusion zone; anavigation data deriving component communicatively coupled with saidterrestrial radio signal reception component, said non-volatile memory,and with a data set and compares said unique identification of saidtransmission source with a station identification of said transmissionsource and a known geographic position of said transmission source, saidnavigation data deriving component configured for deriving a geographicposition of said exclusion zone compliance circuit based upon said knowngeographic position of said transmission source and to determine whethersaid geographic position of said exclusion zone compliance circuit islocated within said exclusion zone; a data blocking componentcommunicatively coupled with said non-volatile memory component andnavigation data deriving component, said data blocking componentconfigured for controlling access of said encrypted data set; and a datacontrol component configured for blocking output of a signal from saidcircuit in response to an indication that said exclusion zone compliancecircuit is located within said exclusion zone.
 2. The circuit of claim 1wherein said non-volatile memory component is selected from the groupconsisting of a read-only memory component and a programmable memorycomponent.
 3. The circuit of claim 1 wherein said circuit comprises anintegrated circuit.
 4. The circuit of claim 1 wherein said data blockingcomponent is configured to verify authenticity of said encrypted dataset.
 5. The circuit of claim 1 wherein said data blocking componentfurther comprises: a verification data determining component configuredfor determining a verification data value based upon said encrypted dataset; and a verification data comparison component communicativelycoupled with said verification data determining component, saidverification data comparison component configured for comparing a secondverification data value stored by said non-volatile memory componentwith said verification data value and wherein said data blockingcomponent prevents said navigation data deriving component fromaccessing said encrypted data set when said verification data comparisoncomponent determines that said verification data value does not matchsaid second verification data value.
 6. The circuit of claim 5 furthercomprising: an encrypted data set input communicatively coupled withsaid non-volatile memory component configured for receiving an updatedencrypted data set.
 7. The circuit of claim 6 wherein said data blockingcomponent further comprises: a date comparison component configured forcomparing a date associated with said updated encrypted data set with asecond date corresponding to a valid encrypted data set and wherein saiddata blocking component is further configured for preventing saidnavigation data deriving component from accessing said updated encrypteddata set when said date comparison component determines that said dateassociated with said updated encrypted data set does not match saidsecond date corresponding to a valid encrypted data set.
 8. The circuitof claim 6 wherein said data blocking component further comprises: atime comparison component configured for comparing a time associatedwith said updated encrypted data set with a second time corresponding toa valid encrypted data set and wherein said data blocking component isfurther configured for preventing said navigation data derivingcomponent from accessing said updated encrypted data set when said timecomparison component determines that said time associated with saidupdated encrypted data set does not match said second time correspondingto a valid encrypted data set.
 9. The circuit of claim 6 furthercomprising: a second encrypted data set input communicatively coupledwith said data control component and configured for receiving a secondencrypted data set; and an encrypted data set output communicativelycoupled with said data control component.
 10. The circuit of claim 6wherein said data blocking component further comprises: an encryptionkey comparator configured for comparing a stored encryption key with anencryption key associated with said updated encrypted data set andwherein said data blocking component is further configured forpreventing a loading of said updated encrypted data set into saidnon-volatile memory component when said stored encryption key does notmatch said encryption key associated with said updated encryption dataset.
 11. The circuit of claim 5, wherein said verification data valuecomprises a checksum value and wherein said second verification datavalue comprises a second checksum value.
 12. The circuit of claim 1further comprising: a speed determining component configured todetermine a speed of said circuit and wherein said signal generatingcomponent is further configured to generate a signal in response to anindication that a speed threshold of said circuit is exceeded; and analtitude determining component configured for comparing an altitude ofsaid circuit with an altitude threshold and for outputting an altitudeexceeding signal when said altitude exceeds an altitude threshold andwherein said signal generating component is further configured togenerate a signal in response to an indication that said altitudethreshold of said circuit is exceeded.
 13. The circuit of claim 1wherein said circuit is disposed within a device further comprising asatellite-signal-based exclusion zone compliance device which isconfigured to generate a signal indicating that it cannot currentlyderive a geographic position within a specified parameter.
 14. Thecircuit of claim 1 wherein said circuit is disposed within a cellulartelephone and wherein said signal from said data control componentcontrols a function of said cellular telephone.
 15. The circuit of claim14 wherein said signal from said data control component prevents saidcellular telephone from receiving a radio transmission.
 16. The circuitof claim 14 wherein said signal from said data control componentprevents said cellular telephone from transmitting a radio signal. 17.The circuit of claim 1 wherein said data control component is configuredto output a signal which disables said circuit in response todetermining that said circuit is located within said exclusion zone. 18.The circuit of claim 1 wherein said data set comprising said uniqueidentification of said transmission source and said known geographicposition of said transmission source comprises a second encrypted dataset which is stored on said non-volatile memory component.
 19. A methodfor implementing exclusion zone compliance, said method comprising:receiving a terrestrial radio signal with a terrestrial radio signalreception component of an exclusion zone compliance circuit, saidterrestrial radio signal comprising a unique identification of atransmission source of said terrestrial radio signal; accessing by anavigation data deriving component a data set disposed within saidexclusion zone compliance circuit comprising a station identification ofsaid transmission source and a known geographic position of saidtransmission source and comparing said received unique identificationwith said station identification of said transmission source stored insaid data set; deriving a geographic position of said exclusion zonecompliance circuit based upon said known geographic position of saidtransmission source; utilizing a non-volatile memory component of saidexclusion zone compliance circuit to store an encrypted data setdescribing boundaries of an exclusion zone; utilizing a data blockingcomponent of said exclusion zone compliance circuit communicativelycoupled with said non-volatile memory component to control access ofsaid encrypted data set; and utilizing a data control component of saidcircuit to block output of a signal from said exclusion zone compliancecircuit in response to an indication that said exclusion zone compliancecircuit is located within said exclusion zone.
 20. The method of claim19 further comprising: generating a signal by said data controlcomponent which causes said exclusion zone compliance circuit to becomedisabled in response to said indication.
 21. The method of claim 19,further comprising: in response to said indication, selectivelydisabling operation of a portion of a cellular telephone in which saidexclusion zone compliance circuit is disposed.
 22. The method of claim21 further comprising: blocking the reception by said cellular telephoneof a radio transmission.
 23. The method of claim 21 further comprising:blocking the transmission by said cellular telephone of a radio signal.24. The method of claim 19 further comprising: generating a signal inresponse to an indication that a speed threshold of said circuit isexceeded; and generating a second signal in response to an indicationthat an altitude threshold of said exclusion zone compliance circuit isexceeded.
 25. The method of claim 19 wherein utilizing said non-volatilememory component further comprises: utilizing a non-volatile memorycomponent selected from the group consisting of a read- only memorycomponent and a programmable memory component.
 26. The method of claim19 wherein utilizing said data blocking component further comprises:verifying authenticity of said encrypted data set.
 27. The method ofclaim 19 wherein utilizing said data blocking component furthercomprises: utilizing a verification data determining component fordetermining a verification data value based upon said encrypted dataset; and utilizing a verification data comparison componentcommunicatively coupled with said verification data determiningcomponent for comparing a second verification data value stored by saidnon-volatile memory component with said verification data value; andutilizing said data blocking component to prevent said navigation dataderiving component from accessing said encrypted data set when saidverification data comparison component determines that said verificationdata value does not match said second verification data value.
 28. Themethod of claim 27 further comprising: receiving an updated encrypteddata set via an encrypted data set input which is communicativelycoupled with said non-volatile memory component.
 29. The method of claim28 further comprising: utilizing a date comparison component to comparea date associated with said updated encrypted data set with a seconddate corresponding to a valid encrypted data set; and using said datablocking component to prevent said navigation data deriving componentfrom accessing said updated encrypted data set when said date comparisoncomponent determines that said date associated with said updatedencrypted data set does not match said second date corresponding to avalid encrypted data set.
 30. The method of claim 28 further comprising:using a time comparison component to compare a time associated with saidupdated encrypted data set with a second time corresponding to a validencrypted data set; and using said data blocking component to preventsaid navigation data deriving component from accessing said updatedencrypted data set when said time comparison component determines thatsaid time associated with said updated encrypted data set does not matchsaid second time corresponding to a valid encrypted data set.
 31. Themethod of claim 28 wherein utilizing said data blocking componentfurther comprises: utilizing an encryption key comparator for comparinga stored encryption key with an encryption key associated with saidupdated encrypted data set; and using said data blocking component toprevent a loading of said updated encrypted data set into saidnon-volatile memory component when said stored encryption key does notmatch said encryption key associated with said updated encrypted dataset.
 32. The method of claim 19 further comprising: storing said dataset comprising said unique identification of said transmission sourceand said known geographic position of said transmission source on saidnon-volatile memory component as a second encrypted data set.
 33. Anelectronic device comprising: a satellite navigation componentconfigured to determine a geographic position of said electronic device;a control component configured to determine that said satellitenavigation component is not able to derive said geographic positionwithin a specified parameter; and an exclusion zone compliance circuit,said circuit comprising: a terrestrial radio signal reception componentof said exclusion zone compliance circuit configured for receiving aterrestrial radio signal, said terrestrial radio signal comprising aunique identification of a transmission source of said terrestrial radiosignal; a non-volatile memory component of said exclusion zonecompliance circuit configured for storing an encrypted data setdescribing boundaries of an exclusion zone; a navigation data derivingcomponent of said exclusion zone compliance circuit communicativelycoupled with said terrestrial radio signal reception component, saidnon-volatile memory, and with a data set comprising a stationidentification of said transmission source and a known geographicposition of said transmission source, said navigation data derivingcomponent configured for comparing said received unique identificationof said transmission source with said station identification stored insaid data set and for deriving a geographic position of said exclusionzone compliance circuit based upon said known geographic position ofsaid transmission source and to determine whether said geographicposition of said exclusion zone compliance circuit is located withinsaid exclusion zone; a data blocking component of said exclusion zonecompliance circuit communicatively coupled with said non-volatile memorycomponent and navigation data deriving component, said data blockingcomponent configured for controlling access of said encrypted data set;and a data control component of said exclusion zone compliance circuitconfigured for blocking output of a signal from said exclusion zonecompliance circuit in response to an indication that said exclusion zonecompliance circuit is located within said exclusion zone.
 34. Theelectronic device of claim 33 wherein said non-volatile memory componentis selected from the group consisting of a read-only memory componentand a programmable memory component.
 35. The electronic device of claim33 wherein said data blocking component is configured to verifyauthenticity of said encrypted data set.
 36. The electronic device ofclaim 33 wherein said data blocking component further comprises: averification data determining component configured for determining averification data value based upon said encrypted data set; and averification data comparison component communicatively coupled with saidverification data determining component, said verification datacomparison component configured for comparing a second verification datavalue stored by said non-volatile memory component with saidverification data value and wherein said data blocking componentprevents said navigation data deriving component from accessing saidencrypted data set when said verification data comparison componentdetermines that said verification data value does not match said secondverification data value.
 37. The electronic device of claim 36 whereinsaid data blocking component further comprises: a date comparisoncomponent configured for comparing a date associated with an updatedencrypted data set with a second date corresponding to a valid encrypteddata set and wherein said data blocking component is further configuredfor preventing said navigation data deriving component from accessingsaid updated encrypted data set when said date comparison componentdetermines that said date associated with said updated encrypted dataset does not match said second date corresponding to a valid encrypteddata set; and a time comparison component configured for comparing atime associated with said updated encrypted data set with a second timecorresponding to a valid encrypted data set and wherein said datablocking component is further configured for preventing said navigationdata deriving component from accessing said updated encrypted data setwhen said time comparison component determines that said time associatedwith said updated encrypted data set does not match said second timecorresponding to a valid encrypted data set.
 38. The electronic deviceof claim 33 wherein said data blocking component further comprises: anencryption key comparator configured for comparing a stored encryptionkey with an encryption key associated with an updated encrypted data setand wherein said data blocking component is further configured forpreventing a loading of said updated encrypted data set into saidnon-volatile memory component when said stored encryption key does notmatch said encryption key associated with said updated encrypted dataset.
 39. The electronic device of claim 33 wherein said electronicdevice comprises a cellular telephone and wherein said data controlcomponent controls a function of said cellular telephone.
 40. Theelectronic device of claim 39 wherein said signal from said data controlcomponent prevents said cellular telephone from receiving a radiotransmission.
 41. The electronic device of claim 39 wherein said signalfrom said data control component prevents said cellular telephone fromtransmitting a radio signal.
 42. The electronic device of claim 33wherein said data control component is configured to output a signalwhich initiates disabling said circuit in response to determining thatsaid circuit is located within said exclusion zone.
 43. The electronicdevice of claim 33 wherein said data set comprising said uniqueidentification of said transmission source and said known geographicposition of said transmission source comprises a second encrypted dataset which is stored on said non-volatile memory component.
 44. A methodfor implementing exclusion zone compliance, said method comprising:determining that a satellite navigation component disposed within anelectronic device cannot derive a geographic position within a specifiedparameter; in response to said determining, receiving a terrestrialradio signal with a terrestrial radio signal reception component of anexclusion zone compliance circuit, said terrestrial radio signalcomprising a unique identification of a transmission source of saidterrestrial radio signal; accessing a data set disposed within saidexclusion zone compliance circuit comprising a station identification ofsaid transmission source and a known geographic position of saidtransmission source and comparing said received unique identificationwith said unique identification of said transmission source stored insaid data set; deriving a geographic position of said exclusion zonecompliance circuit based upon said known geographic position of saidtransmission source; utilizing a non-volatile memory component of saidexclusion zone compliance circuit to store an encrypted data setdescribing boundaries of an exclusion zone; utilizing a data blockingcomponent of said exclusion zone compliance circuit communicativelycoupled with said non-volatile memory component to control access ofsaid encrypted data set; and utilizing a data control component of saidexclusion zone compliance circuit to block output of a signal from saidexclusion zone compliance circuit in response to an indication that saidexclusion zone compliance circuit is located within said exclusion zone.45. The method of claim 44, wherein said receiving a terrestrial radiosignal with a terrestrial radio signal reception component of anexclusion zone compliance circuit, said terrestrial radio signalcomprising a unique identification of a transmission source of saidterrestrial radio signal comprises: receiving a plurality of differenttypes of terrestrial radio signals.
 46. The method of claim 45, whereinsaid deriving a geographic position of said exclusion zone compliancecircuit based upon said known geographic position of said transmissionsource comprises: deriving said geographic position of said exclusionzone compliance circuit via a hybrid position determining approach. 47.The method of claim 44 wherein utilizing said non-volatile memorycomponent further comprises: utilizing a non-volatile memory componentselected from the group consisting of a read- only memory component anda programmable memory component.
 48. The method of claim 44 furthercomprising: verifying authenticity of said encrypted data set.
 49. Themethod of claim 44 wherein utilizing said data blocking componentfurther comprises: utilizing a verification data determining componentfor determining a verification data value based upon said encrypted dataset; utilizing a verification data comparison component communicativelycoupled with said verification data determining component for comparinga second verification data value stored by said non-volatile memorycomponent with said verification data value; and utilizing said datablocking component to prevent a navigation data deriving component fromaccessing said encrypted data set when said verification data comparisoncomponent determines that said verification data value does not matchsaid second verification data value.
 50. The method of claim 49 whereinutilizing said data blocking component further comprises: utilizing adate comparison component for comparing a date associated with anupdated encrypted data set with a second date corresponding to a validencrypted data set; and using said data blocking component to preventsaid navigation data deriving component from accessing said updatedencrypted data set when said date comparison component determines thatsaid date associated with said updated encrypted data set does not matchsaid second date corresponding to a valid encrypted data set.
 51. Themethod of claim 49 wherein utilizing said data blocking componentfurther comprises: using a time comparison component to compare a timeassociated with an updated encrypted data set with a second timecorresponding to a valid encrypted data set; and using said datablocking component to prevent said navigation data deriving componentfrom accessing said updated encrypted data set when said time comparisoncomponent determines that said time associated with said updatedencrypted data set does not match said second time corresponding to avalid encrypted data set.
 52. The method of claim 49 wherein utilizingsaid data blocking component further comprises: utilizing an encryptionkey comparator for comparing a stored encryption key with an encryptionkey associated with an updated encrypted data set; and using said datablocking component to prevent a loading of said updated encrypted dataset into said non-volatile memory component when said stored encryptionkey does not match said encryption key associated with said updatedencrypted data set.
 53. The method of claim 44 wherein said exclusionzone compliance circuit is disposed within a cellular telephone, saidmethod further comprising: controlling a function of said cellulartelephone when said cellular telephone is within said exclusion zone.54. The method of claim 53 further comprising: blocking the reception bysaid cellular telephone of a radio transmission.
 55. The method of claim53 further comprising: blocking the transmission by said cellulartelephone of a radio signal.
 56. The method of claim 44 furthercomprising: storing said data set comprising said unique identificationof said transmission source and said known geographic position of saidtransmission source on said non-volatile memory component as a secondencrypted data set.
 57. The method of claim 44, further comprising: inresponse to said indication, selectively disabling operation of saidexclusion zone compliance circuit.